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iii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Communication sets out a strategy to secure a full role for Europe in  the development of 
the next generation of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and so full opportunity in 
the relatedmarket. The central recommendation is that ~uroie  should develop a new satellite 
navigation constellation, combined with appropriate terrestrial infraslructurc: Galileo. 
The EU is.faced with a fonriidable challenge but also with a major opportunity in  respect of 
global satellite navigatio* which is becoming central to all forms of transport and many other 
activities. These systems will play a crucial role in creating the integrated European transport 
system that is crucial to support the single market.  Further, EU Member States have public 
obligations to provide safe navigation services and other public services {for example, search 
and rescue) and GNSS can be the most cost-effective means of achieving this, 
The issue is not, therefore, whether Europe should rely on satellite navigation systems for the 
,future, but what economic benefits, including jobs,  it would gain from playing a full role in 
development of the system, and what degree of control it will have over the system on which 
its safety critical services will depend. 
Last year, the Commission identified the following problems with continued reliance on third 
countries' systems1: 
There are serious problems  of both  sovereignty and  security if  Europe's  safety critical 
navigation systems 'are out of Europe's control. Furthermore, the present systems cannot 
fully meet civil users requirements in terms of performance.  ' 
.  There is a need to ensure that European users are not at risk from changes in the service.or 
excessive future charges or fees: faced with a dominant position  orvirtual monopoly, it  -. 
would be difficult to resist such charges and perhaps impossible to develop alternatives 
.quickly. 
*  The capacity for EU industry to compete in this lucrative market (a potential globa1,market 
of €40 billion by  2005) would be seriously constrained. (Europe's capacity to compete in 
the  market  for  services  could  be  undermined  if  it  did  not  have  equal  access  to'the . 
technological developments in the system itself). 
. 
-. 
The strategic choice 
Work by the Commission over the last year has focussed on two key areas: identifying the 
scope for joint  approaches with the US,  the Russian .Federation and others, and clarifying 
what a European system would look like, and how much it would cost. With a clear view on 
both these points, the EU is now in a position to make the key choices. 
As the communication makes clear, an  urgent decision is needed: the US  is committed to 
developing GPS and reinforcing its global dominance. They already have a headstart. unless 
Europe gives a firm political commitment  now  to  developing  a European system, to  be in 
place at the same time as the next generation of GPS, it will simply bc too latc. 
Communication  'Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation Network - including a European 
strategy for Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS),' COM (98)  29 final of 2 I  January 1998 The shape of Europe's 'best buy' is now relatively clear: 
a  It must be an open, global, system, fully compatible with GPS, but independent  from it, 
with a significant role for the Russian Federation. 
It should be based on medium Earth orbit (MEO) satellites and will cost between €2.2  and 
2.9 billion; 
It should be developed as a public private partnership, with significant funding at Europcan 
level, and reliance on creating new revenue streams. 
The  omm mission considers that this option provides a means of achieving Europe's strategic, 
commercial, transport and employment objectives at an acceptable cost. It is therefore clearly 
preferable to the 'zero option' (relying on the existing military constellations). 
Scope for international co-operation 
In last year's communication, three broad options were identified: 
- a joint global system with all the major players; 
- the EU developing a GNSS with one or more international partners (particularly, the US or 
Russia);  . 
- independent development by the EU of its own system:  . 
The Commission  recognised  that,  in  principle, joint  development  of the next  generation 
GNSS was likely to be the most cost-effective option, but made clear that co-operation would 
need to satisfy certain conditions: firm guarantees against disruption, full participation in the 
future design, development  and  operation of GNSS, a  full  EU role  in the cqntrol  of the 
system, and an opportunity for European  industry to compete in  all segments of the market. 
' 
The Council endorskd this approach and requested the Commission to intensify contact with,  .  . 
in  particular,  the  US  and  the  Russian  Federation.  Following  extensive  contacts,  the 
Commission has now reached the following conclusions on the scope for joint development. 
The US is not willing to share control of GPS (primarily for military reasons) though it.  is 
positive  about  co-operation  in  certain  technical  areas.  They  also  recognise  that  two 
complementary systems (GPS + Galileo) will increase overall robustness, allowing satellite 
navigation and precision  timing to be employed in more critical applications (e.g.  as sole 
means  of navigation  for  certain  operations)  or more  difficult  areas  (e.g. in'  cities).  It  is 
proposed that this co-operation should be pursued. 
The  Russian  Federation  is  offering,  effectively,  full  partnership  in  developing  a  new 
international civil system from the basis of the present GLONASS. The principal advantages 
of this approach would be that Europe could, through use of Russian know-how in satellite 
operation and control, develop a robust Galileo more quickly than otherwise. This would also 
D 
allow shared use of the valuable GLONASS frequency allocation. 
The recommended approach  is, therefore to develop a Galileo which  is global  in coverage 
from the outset and independent from the US GPS, but fully interoperable with it.   his would 
be open to participation by other partners. In particular, there could be major advantages for 
Europe from Russian involvement, if this can be established  on a satisfactory basis. Within 
the constraints of interoperability with GPS, it would exploit new, state-of-the-art capabilities, 
v allowing  the  development  of  new  applications,  making  the  overall  GNSS  robust  and 
remedying certain shortcomings of the present GPS (e.g. poor availability in  urban areas and 
the  northernmost  latitudes,  unpredictable  temporary  gaps  in  coverage,  including  over  the 
European continental landmass). 
What system to choose 
The proposal  for Galileo is based on  a core constellation of ME0  satellites, combined with 
appropriate  infrastructure  and  terrestrial  systcms to  provide  thc  integrated  servicc  rcquired 
from, the  Trans-European  positioning  and  navigation  network.  This  approach  represcnts 
minimum  technical  risk,  since  existing  systems 'use this  technology,  particularly  if  co- 
operation with the Russian Federation can be established on a satisfactory basis. The approach 
would need to be global fromthe outset if Europe is to reap thc hcnefits of a global prcscncc 
and provide a global market for the system and its applications. 
Finance 
The key question is how Europe should  finance a system. As long as the-US continues to 
provide its basic GPS signal free of charge, it is clear that European public spending would be 
needed for the development of Galileo. A three point financing strategy is proposed: 
substantial  financing at  European  level, through  the  EU Budget, notably  the  Transport 
.  . 
TEN, 'and through ESA; 
establishment of revenue streams, which is likely to require regulatory action ;  and 
e  dkveloping a public private partnership (PPP), to deliver donipicmcntary linancc and value 
for money. However, firm  political decisions are required to give industry the confidence 
to invest.  .  . 
As far as EU funding is concerned, it is suggested that around €500  million (10% of the total 
budget  for transport,  TENs proposed  by  the  Commission  in Agenda  2000) could. be made 
'  available from the TENs Transport budget (ESA envisages being able to contribute a similar 
amount). A further €120  million or so for research and development  activities could come 
from  the  5"'  Framework  Programme,  with  further  funding  possibly  available  from  a  6"' 
Framework Programme. 
A number of possible revenue streams have been  identified, notably  the idea of a .levy on 
GNSS receivers,  together with  charges  for a restricted access service which could provide 
guaranteed levels of performance, liability cover, etc. These could contribute significantly to 
financing Galileo if the Council is minded to put the appropriate regulation in place. 
A PPP for Galileo could providi  complementaryfinance, improve project design, and ensure 
overall value for money. Crucially, it would confirm private sector commitment to the project. 
In  particular,  the need to encourage take-up of the service in order to generate income and 
reach profitability would provide a powerful mechanism for ensuring users' needs are given 
central importance, while a PPP structure will help keep costs under control since much of the 
risk of construction cost over-run would normally  fall on  the private  sector. It  would  also 
reflect the fact that Galileo combines public service and commercial aspects. The aim would 
be  for the project  to approach  self-financing in the operational -phase when' recurring costs 
(operations and replenishment) would amount to between €140  million and€205 million per 
year. 
vi The ideal approach  would  be to set up  a full  PPP as soon as possiblc.  This would  bc  tlic 
design-build-operate model. But  this  will  require  a significant  amo~~nt  of furthcr work  on 
performance requirements, risk allocation and revcnuc strcanis. Each of lhesc arcas nccds to 
be  explored  in  co-operation  with  the  privatc  sector.  This  would  bc  a  ccnttal  part  of tlic 
Definition phase of the project. 
Organisational issues 
Galileo would be a unique project, involving a wide range of political, econon~ic,  security and 
commercial  interests.  It  will  need  an  organisational  structure  that  reflects  this  unique 
character. A number of issues affect the organisational structure. A PPP carries implications 
for organisational structure: the aim will be to establish a 'vehicle company' to carry out the 
deployment and subsequently operate the system. However, some central aspects of Galileo 
fall firmly within the public domain. Involving international partners in Galileo would imply 
that they would need to be part of decision-making structures. 
Three basic levels are identified: 
Political/strategic,  providing  overall  direction,  and  handling  main  international 
negotiations.  It  is recommended  that the  EU institutional  framework would be  used  for 
strategic  decisions.  The  Commission  should  thcn  lead  thc  international  negotiations, 
initially with the  US and Russian Federation, on  the basis of guidelines adoplcd by  thc 
Council. 
s  The Programme Management Board which would be responsible for ensuring the project 
is completed, with financial decisions, and .for establishing the terms of any tender, and 
have the contractual relationship with the PPP vehicle company. In the operation phase, 
this would become the Galileo administration. 
o  The PPP vehicle company. 
But not all decisions need to be taken now, and the project should now pass to the definition 
phase,  financed  by  public  money,  in  which  the  work  necessary  to  put  in  place  the  final 
structures, especially the PPP, is carried out. 
Recommendations 
The Community institutions are, therefore, invited to: 
- take a firm  political  decision  to  develop Galileo, as described  above, which  represents 
minimum technical risk and best value for money, in order to guarantee Europe's stratcgic 
.  .  . , 
interests; 
- endorse  the  three  point  financial  strategy:  substantial  European  level  financing, 
development of revenue streams, and a PPP approach. In particular, endorse ~alileo  as a 
key priority under the TENS, to benefit from funding on a muiti-annual basis (estimated 
,  42500 million over the period 2000-2006) 
- recognise the need  for negotiations  and technical  discussions  with  third  countries.  The 
Commission should be requested to negotiate suitable agreements on GNSS on the basis of 
guidelines to be adopted by the Council. 
- agree the organisational  approach for the project definition phase, with urgent efforts to 
establish the permanent structures identified. 
vii In  its  conclusions  of  17  March  1998  on  the  European  Conlmission's  communication 
'Towards  a Trans-European  Positioning and  Navigation  Network -  .including a  European 
strategy for Gjobal Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSS),' the European Union (EU) Council 
of Ministers requested the Commission to prcsent recommendations on  the future Europcan 
-.  approach to global satellite navigation. 
The Commission was requested to intensify its contacts with  important international partners. 
such as the United States of America (US) and the Russian Federation, so as to assess the 
potential  for joint  development of a system that meets the Community's requirements. The 
Commission was also asked .to accelerate its work to  examine the option of developing an 
autonomous ~uro~ean  satellite navigation system.  ,. 
In  January  1999,  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a  Resolution  on  the  Commission's 
Communication2. This, inter  alia, called upon the Member  States of the  EU to  convene a 
European  Space  Council  at  the ,Head. of  State  or  Government  level.  and  requested  the 
Commission to present as soon as possible a coherent strategy for the development of a Trans- 
European positioning and navigation network. 
Since March  7998, an  unprecedented  number  of meetings  of the  major  actors of a future 
satellite navigation system has taken place, involving several hundred of the most important' 
players in the field. Equally, a dense schedule of meetings with international partners has been 
followed. This Communication reports on the results of the work carried out this last year and 
proposes  a  European  strategy  for  the  medium  term,  together  with  an  implementation 
programme. 
.  . 
The intention is to enable  the Community institutions  to  take the  necessary  decisions  on 
implementing a European contribution to the next generation GNSS.  In .this ~omknication, 
the European project that will result has been provisionally called ~alileo. 
The  Communication  therefore  includes  a  set  of  policy  conclusions,  and  the  list  of 
supplementary  actions  that  need  to  be  accomplished  over  the  next  few  months.  The 
Commission will also soon produce negotiating  guidelines in order to have the appropriate 
international agreements in place in time. The three key points are to agree that Europe should 
'  ' 
develop Galile~  as soon as possible; to agree the general architectural design of Galileo; and  .  . 
to establish an appropriate financing framework, with-maximum private sector involvement as 
early  as  possible  (Public-Private  Partnerships)  and  earmarking  of  the  necessary  public 
funding. Developing an  adequate regulatory,  operational  and project  management  structure 
will be a major priority for the next stage. 
2.  THE  CHALLENGE FACING EUROPE 
I  . . 
2.1.  The issues at stake 
The EU is faced with a formidable challenge but also with a major opportunity.  '  . 
A4 -  04  13/98, 13 January 1999. Strategic considemtibns: At present, there are two core Global Navigation  Satellite systems 
-  the US GPS and the Russian Federation's  GLONASS -  and GPS currently dominates the 
market. GNSS is becoming central not only to all forms of transport, but also to many other 
activities. For example, manufacturing industries and the service sector increasingly depend 
on GNSS for positioning andlor precision timing. This reliance raises important questions of a 
-  strategic nature, including for the Common Foreign an'd Security Policy, especially if the core 
systems are not under European control or influence. 
Europe is now in a position to decide whether to develop a new system. The challenge is to 
guarantee'EuropeYs  strategic needs without excessive cost or risk. By contrast, failure to act 
would strengthen the present US market dominance and leave Europe entirely dependent on 
the US for many security-related matters. 
Galileo gives Europe clear opportunities for strengthening political ties with other countries. 
  he US and Europe have already recognised that co-operation could be mutually beneficial, at 
least in the field of civil applications, and co-operation with the Russian Federation could also 
have  considerable  mutual  benefit,  strengthening  the  Partnership  and  Co-operation 
Agreement). Other countries may also become partners in the venture, increasing international 
co-operation  and  supporting  global  market  development  and  both  inward  and  outward 
investment. 
The  trunsport  dimension:  It  is  clear  that  satellite  navigation  will  increasingly  play  a 
fundamental role in transport in the future. GNSS will be part of an intelligent infrastructure, 
helping to ensure safety4, streamline traffic operations, reduce congestion and environmenta'l 
damage  and. support  multi-modal  development.  Advanced  navigation  systems  are  a 
prerequisite for efficient transport management and sustainable mobility which are themselves 
critical for economic growth. 
Further, under different international Conventions, EU Member States have public obligations 
to provide safe navigation and certain other public services (for example, search and rescue). 
A coherent Galileo programme, integrating, as appropriate, other systems, can ensure cost- 
effectiveness and potentially allow considerable economies to be made in public spending. 
Galileo could also remedy shortcomings of the prcsent GPS and  GLONASS constellations 
which cannot guarantee the reliability and availability which is indispensable for transport and 
vital economic operations.  Further, one potential advantage of having two independent but 
compatible space navigation systems (GPS + Galileo) is that each system acts as a backup to 
the other, so that  it becomes possible  to  base safety-of-life applications solely  on  satellite 
navigation. The satellite service can thus supersede certain terrestrial infrastructure, resulting  .  . 
in further substantial savings on operation and maintenance. 
Agreement  on Partnership  and Cooperation,  signed  on 24 June  1994 by  the  European  Union  and the 
Russian  Federation.  It  represents  a  commitment  from  both  sides  to  promote  and  encourage political, 
economic and scientific partnerships. 
The  GNSS  Strategic  Study,  carried  out  for  the  Commission  in  April  1998, noted,  for  example,  that 
combined transport-related  communication  and GNSS navigation data could be directly beneficial to rail, 
assisting  in  train  control  and  collision  avoidance,  especially  where  it  is  uneconomical  to  provide  the 
electrical power needed for passive sensor beacons or track-side vandalism is a problem. The  economic/irzdustrial tlimension: Tbc  Con~niission Communication  of  January  1 098 
outline<  the  vast  array  of  potential  applicalions  lor  a  satcl litc  liniing,  posiiioning  -  ;~tlti 
navigation system and the economic opporlutiitics thcse offcr (a potenlial global markc!  01' 
€40  billion  by  20055).  Almost  every day  new  applications  are  being 'added  to  the  list  of 
services which are based on GNSS. The challenge is to  ensure that Europe can take a fair 
share of  the global market, and the related jobs.  User demand  for  GNSS-based  goods  and 
services is increasing quickly. The GPS hardware market in  Europe was estimated in 1997 at 
$228.7 million and is anticipated to grow to $960 million in 2004".  Annex  IV givcs further 
detail on  future market prospects.  Further, establishing  a fully robust GNSS infrastructure 
would  accelerate  the  development  and  introduction  of  a  wide  variety  of  value  added 
applications for all transport modes over large geographical  areas, thus bringing  the socio- 
economic benefits which result fiom these services milch earlier7. In this respect, Galileo can 
contribute significantly  by  bringing  new  levels  of  performance,  increasing  GNSS' service 
availability and providing guarantees and 'liabiiity cover which will both support the general 
market growth and.attract particularly those customers requiring high standards. 
The Galileo  debate over the  last  few months  has  demonstrated  the  project's  potential  for 
developing  interest  and  increasing  awareness  for. commercjal  applications. -The European 
Parliament  has  ernphasised  the  advantages  of  creating  a  'general  culture  of  using  space 
applications technologies' which could be ensured through the European participation  .  . in the 
development of GNSS. 
It  is recognised  that,  with European  involvement  in  the evolving signal  structure  and  the 
possibility  of adapting the programme  to  users'  future requirements,  Galileo  should  help 
industry  stay at the leading edge of the development of future applications. bforeover,  the 
existence  of  a  competitive  system  to  GPS  would  ensure  that  no unilateral  decisions  on 
.  ,  charging could be taken which would destabilise industrial planning. 
Over the  last decade, space has  increasingly become an  area  for commercial  exploitation. 
Telecommunications and broadcasting  are two examples. There is fierce competition in  the 
deregulated fields and major players are increasingly joining forces to generate economies of 
scale. In Europe too, the space industry is restructuring to take on the challenge that it faces in 
global  competition. Giving a political  direction  for  Galileo would  support  the  space and 
defence industries in their restructuring. The political lead could bring added value, helping 
ensure Europe's position in this strategic sector. 
The ESA-funded  GNSS-2 Comparative  System Studies have  identified a number of  important  political 
benefits from a Galileo over and above a GPS-only baseline, in part due to the improved performance of a 
joint GPSIGalileo system. These include an additional E40 billion from sales of equipment, and €40  billion 
from value added services for European firms over the period  2005-2023:Other  analysis has focused on 
benefits to transport  users, although the increasing integration of  navigation and communication  services 
will fuel the already significant growth in non-transport applications.. Between  the major transport modes, 
expected total benefits are in the region of €1 8 billion over the first live years of operation of Galileo. 
O.  Report by Frost and Sullivan, quoted in Global Positioning System Market Projections and Trends in the 
Ne'west 'Global Information Utility, International Trade Administration, Office of ~elecommunic~tions,  US 
Department of Commerce. 
The implementation of many value added mass market applications, most notably for road transport, would 
be accelerated, with market saturation reached  10 years earlier (GNSS-2 Forum Technical and Financial 
Group'Report, December 1998). There is also an increasing need  to develop  synergies between  the existing national  space 
agencies and  with  ESA  and  to  establish  the  right  co-ordination  with  the wider  European 
political  institutions (EU, WEUX).  Galileo could provide the catalyst to allow an cxcmplary 
division of labour between the diffcrcnt actors and institutions to dcvclop. 
Employment:  The presence  of European  industry  in  this  high  technology  field,  which  is 
beginning  to  develop  exponentially,  will  help  to  secure  and  augment  employment.  It  is 
estimated that putting the satellite navigation infrastructure into place would support 20,000 
jobs;  its operation would  create 2,000 permanent jobs  with  considerable new  en~ployment 
opportunities in applications (hardware and services)  'I. 
Regulatory issues: Increasingly, European regulatory requirements could envisage the use of 
' 
information systems relying on positioning and/or timing signals. This could, for example, be 
the  case  in  the  future  for  electronic  fee  collection~0,  in  the  environmental  field  or  in 
agricultural or fisheries surveillance. A Galileo would allow for the necessary certification to 
take place (something which is not possible with current systems), thus ensuring regulators' 
and users' confidence in the adequacy of such systems. Regulatory action could thus underpin 
Community objectives. 
2.2.  Timing considerations 
An early decision is important, as a rare window of opportunity is open. The US has taken its 
basic decisions on the design of the next generation of GPS satellite (block IIF), including the 
definition of a second civil  frequency, and will be deploying the new satellites in the next 
decade. If Europe waits, the new block IIF will reinforce the present GPS dominance and the 
market will have adopted GPS as the standard.' Realistically  Europe could then play only a 
supporting role. 
By  contrast,  action  now  would  permit  Europe  to  develop  an  improved  service  (signal 
structure, power  levels,  etc)  which, -though interoperable  and  fully  compatible  with  GPS, 
would  give  Europe  a real  possibility  to  penetrate  the  market.  Galileo could  be-  deployed 
considerably quicker than otherwise, making it more competitive, if Europe's  approach were 
to build on GLONASS, provided that serious attention is given to building confidence in the 
system and promoting it globally. The challenge is to act decisively and in time. 
A  decision has to be taken  as early as possible  in  1999, establishing a  medium-term 
policy  for  Europe's  involvement  in  the  next  generation  satellite-based  positioning, 
navigation and timing systems. No decision is, by default, a decision to exclude Europe 
Western  European  Union,  composed  of  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain  and  UK.  It also  has  a  number  of Associatc  Mcmbcrs  (Iccland.  Norway. 
Turkey),  Associate  Partners  (Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  I'ola~id, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), and Observers (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden) 
Current estimates within the ESA GNSS-2 comparative study suggest a Galileo project would also increase 
employment  in equipment production and sale from less than  25,000  (based on GPS alone) to  around 
70,000 (GPS + Galileo) in 2008. In total, therefore, it is anticipated that, by 2008, in the region of 100,000 
jobs in direct, indirect and induced employment depend on going ahead with Galileo. 
Commission Communication on electronic fee collection, COM (98) 795 final of 21 December 1998. from the development of.a  strategic sector and the definition of new globall stmmdards, 
with serious consequewces for strategic, &oaomk, industrial, empioymennt and transport 
policies;  a  deferrqJ  decision  will  also  mean  that  US  dominance  wilf  be  further 
consoiiidated,  so  Europe  will  find  it  considerably  more  dimcult,  and  probably 
impossible, to ellater the market, and will essentialiy have to accept the standards set by 
the US. A long-term EU commitment needs to be given to generate the development of 
market ipplications and support private imvestment in the system. 
3.  RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS  AND  PRELIMINARY  CONCLUSIONS  ON  THE  STRATEGIC 
CI~OICES'FOR  EUROPE 
In last year's communication, three broad options were identified: 
- a joint global system with all the major players; 
- the EU developing a GNSS with one or more international partners (partic'ularly, the US or 
Russia); 
- independent development by the EU bf its own system. 
.  . 
Extensive contacts with our internatibnal partners have made it possible to narrow down these 
options considerably. 
3.1.  Joint development of a system: potential for co-operation with the US 
In view of this considerable challenge facing Europe, the March  1998 Council requested the 
Commission  to  explore with  the US the possibility  to  develop a common  system. Three 
sessions of discussion took place with the US (in May, July and November  1998). It rapidly 
became clear that the US could not consider future joint ownership and a full role for Europe 
in  the  control  of  the  basic  24-satellite  GPS  constellation  (primarily  because  of  military 
considerations).  Co-operation with the US would therefore need to be based either on reliance 
on  the  existing  US-controlled  GPS  or  on  developing  a  GNSS  based  around  two 
complementary  satellite  navigation  systems,  one  GPS  and  one  Europeadinternational. 
Besides clarifying and reducing the number  of options, the useful discussions with the US 
administration allowed progress to be made towards establishing principles which could form 
the basis of a future co-operation agreement. 
Buseline for  US-EU co-opemtion 
From  the US perspective,  in  both  cases,  fruitful co-operation  with .Europe would  only be 
possible if Europe accepted the GPS standard positioning service (SPS) and signal structure as 
a  basis  for  all  civil applications of  the  future  GNSS. This would  avoid  prolifcralion  of 
different systems and also ensure the policy stability which is important for industrial reasons. 
If Europe committed itself to GPS as a global stedard, the US would consider European 
participation  in the process of developing and modemising the GPS system, as well as an 
' 
appropriate EU role in civil operations and management. The US would also consider making 
a statement of intent to provide continued access to the GPS signal, fiee of direct user charges, 
to  discontinue  Selective Availability  and  t~  observe  an  agreed  notice  period  prior  to  any 
planned  withdrawal  of  the  GPS  signal.  If  the  EU  decided  to  invest  in  developing  and 
implementing a constdlation which complemented GPS, the joint EU~S  objective could be to establish a fully interoperable, global system consisting of two independent components. 
There is consensus between the US and Europe that two independent systems would iniprovc 
the  robustness  and  the  possible  perforrnancc  of  the  overall  GNSS  systcni  and  might 
potentially allow sole use as a means of navigation for certain safety-related activities. Such 
an orientation could have considerable implications for the way Galileo develops and for its 
cost-effectiveness. 
3.2.  Joint development of a system: the Russian Federation 
Discussions  with  the  Russian  Federation  took  place  in  May,  July  and  October  1998. The 
Russian Federation has proposed a joint approach to develop a state-of-the-art global navigation 
satellite system and appears willing to meet the requirements outlined in the Commission's 
communication of January 1998, and endorsed by the Council, allowing for joint ownership and 
management of the hture constellation. The Russian authorities have developed a transition 
plan for GLONASS which would include its transfer to civil control and its promotion  as a 
system Yor  civil use".  It would  initially be an independent  complement to GPS and would 
gradually evolve into Galileo (progressively improving the robustness and performance of the 
overall GNSS system). 
The  principal  advantages  of  this  approach  would  be  that,  if  co-operation  developed 
satisfactorily, Europe could, through use of Russian operational know-how, develop Galileo 
in  a  much  shorter time  than  otherwise, and  that  it  would  allow  the  valuable  GLONASS 
frequency band to be used, despite the present strong competition  for access to scarce radio 
frequencies, especially for commercial telecommunications. It would not limit options for the 
future. 
In  this  scenario,  a  gradualist  approach. would  be  pursued,  beginning  with  a  political 
frainework to  facilitate initially the exchange of know-how between  industrial actors, while 
possible  operational  arrangements  are  explored.  This  would  be  set  in  the.context  of.  the 
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, taking full account of EU security interests, and the 
objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
3.3.  Japan as potential partner for a joint development of a system 
Japan has issued a joint  statement with the US to recognise GPS as a global standard. Tnis is 
designed primarily to  encourage a market-lcd  dcvclopment of applications bascd  on  salcllitc 
navigation.  However,  it  does not  undermine  possible  alternativc  approachcs  to  CNSS-2  or 
preclude R&D efforts. Although Japan is thus concentrating at this stage on GNSS-1, they are 
increasingly  showing  interest  in  Europe's  attitude  to  a  possible  GNSS-2.  Building  on  the 
constructive dialogue which  has developed to  ensure interoperability between  the respective 
GNSS-1  space-based augmentations (EGNOS and MSAS), Japan  may become  interested in 
being involved in a Europe-led development of a Galileo space segment. This could thus help 
reduce  calls on the  European public purse. A decision to  go  ahead with Galileo should be. 
accompanied by continuing discussions on the possibility of Japan taking a significant role in it. 
Exploratory  discussions  should  therefore rapidly  take place  with  appropriate  ministries  and 
1'  The  launch  on  30  December  1998  of  three  new  satellites  demonstrates  the  Russian  Federation's 
commitment, despite economic pressures, to maintaining GLONASS. A further launch is being planned. A 
modernised GLONASS satellite with longer life expectancy has been designed but hither improvements 
are foreseen through integration of Western standards. agencies on  possible  future co-operation. Industrial co-operation appears to provide an  early 
opportunity to develop the relationship. 
3.4,  Other countries and regions as potential partners for,a joint development of a 
system 
<. 
As regards other couritries, several have indicated interest in  co-operating with the EU to obtain 
benefits from GNSS-1 and to consider GNSS-2. Such co-operation could remedy deficiencies in 
present  navigation  infkastructure, create the  full global  market  opportunities, that  have been 
recognised and support effective development of industrial co-operation. It should, however, be 
clear that the nature of this co-operation is unlikely to reduce significantly the cost of building 
Galileo but could contribute to  global interoperability and potential market opportunities and 
revenue streams. 
Initial  contacts  in  this  framework have been  made  with  the  Central  and  Eastern  European 
countries, Turkey, Switzerland, Iceland, countries in the CIS, Africa and South America, as well 
as Canada, Australia, India, China and Korea. For industrial, strategic and political reasons, as 
well as for the safe, effective and  efficient transportation of goods and people, it is vital to 
promote Europe's GNSS approach with third countf es, not least the candidates for accession, so 
that.they are able to contribute to its success. Europe can then develop and.export a new g16bal 
standard. 
3.5.  GNSS-2 Forum 
In  order to fulfil the March 1998 Council remil, the Commission set up the GNSS-2 ForumI2 
which mobilised most of the relevant European actors in the field (over the period July to 
December  1998). The work  of the GNSS-2  Forum,  as well  as the results  of a number of 
studies, and in particular the  findings of,the  ESA GNSS-2 Comparative system 
Studies, have contributed to shaping the opinion and recommendations of the Commission; 
The most relekt  cdnclusions of the Forum suggest that the future GNSS system should be 
based on a combination  of GPS and a global European-led component (Galileo). Thelatter 
should be open to  the  inclusion of comp1ementary~'contributions  from third  countries  and 
organisations  (subject  to  industrial,  political,  military  and  security  considerations).  The 
analysis of the different  criteria for GNSS-2 points strongly towards the need to develop a 
system that can provide at least two  levels of service. These should include a basic public 
service, provided  free of charge as  long as the equivalent  US  GPS  service 'is free, and  a 
service designed  for  users who require  a high  level  of service guarantees  (for example in 
terms of the availability  and  integrity  of the signal). The development  of a public-private 
partnership (PPP) approach was seen as a priority: the Forum recommended analysing more 
concretely how best to attract private investment. It was felt that the system should be global 
f?om  the start in order to allow full development of the global market, to meet the needs of 
global  industries  (e.g.  aviation and  the  maritime  sectori;  financial  institutions .and  others 
12  The GNSS-2 Forum included leading experts from industry, European institutions and organisations, radio-, 
navigation  service  providers,  user  communities  and  academia  and  supported  the  development  of ,the 
Commission's  thinking on institutional  and legal matters,  technical  and  financial evaluation  of different 
approaches, civivmilitary and security issues and user requirements. The Forum met in plenary and group  - 
sessions and produced a final report in December 1998. - 
dependent on precision timing) and because no partners were identified wishing at this stage 
to develop matching regional contributions. 
3.6.  The European Parliament 
The Commission Communication of January  1998 was considered by the Parliament which, 
on  the  basis  of a  comprehensive report,  adopted  a Resolution  on  13 Januarj 1999. This 
recognised  that  European  industry  had  previously  suffered  from  a  lack  of clear  political 
direction and commitment in the space sector by the European institutions and welcomed.the 
Commission's paper, considering' that a strategy had been needed for years. Parliament called 
on  the  Member States to  give clear  decisions at  Heads  of State or Government  level on 
strategic, technical and  budgetary  guidelines  and  on the timetable  for  GNSS-2.  It  equally 
asked the Commission to conduct in-depth negotiations with international  partners,  to  lead 
European negotiations in the international fora for satellite orbital positions  and frequencies 
assignment  to  satellite navigation  services  and  to  provide  a regulatory  framework  for the 
creation. of  an  internal  market  for  applications  of  European  space  technologies,  whilst 
stressing that GNSS should, as far as possible, be financed through models of privatelpublic 
partnerships and user contributions. 
3.7.  Rejecting &he  'Zero Option' 
All scenarios need to be compared with the zero option: a conscious decision to abstain from 
having a European presence in the core space segment of the future GNSS. This would mean 
reliance on the US GPS system and, potentially, the Russian Federation's GLONASS or -any 
new system 'developed by other states. 
Clearly, a European  decision 'to concentrate on applications and augmentation  systems and 
abstain from moving into satellite-based navigation would be welcomed by the US since this 
would confirm the present  and ensure the  future dominance  of GPS. Moreover, European 
research and Trans-European Network money might be concentrated on GPS augmentatioli 
(including through systems such as EGNOS) and developing GPS-based applications in the 
intelligent transport sector and in other domains. 
The arguments outlined  above in  chapter 2  'The  Challenge  for Europe'  speak  against the 
abandonment of the European  ambition to participate  in  the control  of the space segment. 
However, it is clear that public spending would have to be carefully estimated, planned and 
controlled and that the private sector would have to take, where reasonable, part of the risk of 
developing Galileo. Besides looking at technical features and organisational issues, the main 
thrust-of this Communication is therefore to make recommendations to ensure that Europe 
can afford to be present in the  future  Global Navigation Satellite System. 
Conclusion:  The  'zero  option'  leaves  Europe  without  adequate  assurance  that  its 
political,  strategic,  economic,  employment,  industrial,  security,  space  and,  of  course, 
transport and other interests are preserved. 
Drawing together the resuPts  of discussions with the XIS  and Russian  Federation, the 
recommendations of the GNSS-2 Forum and on the basis of the views of the Council and 
the  ParPisarnent,  the  Commission  has  concluded  that  a  Galileo,  having the  following 
characteristics, s&oaakP. be developed: 
- Kt  would  be  independent  from  the  US  GPS,  but  compEementary  to  it,  and  - interoperable with it. 
- It would be open to other partners to participate. In particular, there could be major 
advantages for Europe from Russian  involvement,  if  this can be established  on  a 
satisfactory basis. 
- Within the constraints of interoperability with GPS, GaliIeo would exploit new, state- 
of-the-art capabilities in a civil system, allowing the development of-new  applications, 
making the overall GNSS robust and remedying certain shortcomings of the present 
GPS  (e.g.  poor  a;ailability  in  urban  areas  and  the  northerornost  latitudes, 
unpredictable temporary gaps in coverage, including over the European continental 
landmass). 
- It would be global in coverage from the outset, to ensure effective independence and 
to provide a globail market for the system and its applications. Galileo would include 
a restricted access service. 
.  . 
4.  SYSTEM  ARCHITECTURE  AND TECHNICAL  FEATURES 
This chapter considers which architecture would be best suited.to meet the demands of users 
in a cost-effective manner. It represents the first outline of Galileo. 
4.1.  Performance requirements 
For aviation and maritime users, there are already international performance requirements for 
navigation systems. Essentially, a world-wide requirement of 10 metre horizontal accuracy is 
the minimum standard which Galileo would need to meet-  if it is to be.accepted as an inherent 
component 0f.a world-wide radio-navigation systemI3. 
'. 
Other  users  have  not  devcloped  similarly  prccisc  dcniands  whicli  have  thc  backing  of 
regulation.  There are also potential users whosc nccds have not  bccn  defined,. although the 
,  ,  market potential has been identified. 
The GNSS-2 Forum identified certain-broad performance requirements for Galileo, including 
that it would need.  to provide approximately equivalent performance to the next generation of 
GPS (Block IIF) if it was to be regarded as a credible system14,  that thespace segment should 
not  attempt  to  provide  all  navigation  solutions15 and  that  additional  navigation-related 
communications capabilities on board the satellites would be useful. 
13-  Users can directly determine their navigation solution (three-dimensional position, veldcity and time) in real 
time when receiving at least four signals from four different satellites, without referring to other systems.. 
l4  This has been interpreted as meaning global landmass and coastal water coverage at not less than 911  metres 
horizontal and vertical accuracy, without local arca augmentation, 95% of thc time. Higher levels of scrvice 
should be available from the system through intekration with terrestrial augmentation. 
l5  A  comprehensive navigation  network for Europe, with  the required  levels  of robustness  and  integrating 
satellite-based and appropriate terrestrial technologies, will be designed and proposed by.the Commission as 
a European Radio-Navigation Plan, once decisions have been taken on the European involvement in GNSS. 
9 During the project definition phase, the input of user groups, potential service providers and 
public  authorities will be vital. Only aRer this can precise mission  requirements  be set and 
final decisions made on the required terrestrial and space infrastructure. 
,The aim  of  the  European  radio-navigation  strategy  must  bc  Lo  mcel  sct  pcrfornlance 
requirements  with  regard  to  security  and  safety cost-effectively.  There  will  inevitably  be 
satellite-based components and terrestrial elements, supporting overall system robustness. The 
indications  from  experts  and  accepted  by  the  Commission  in  defining  an  approach  to 
European involvement in GNSS are as follows. 
The definition of the architecture is based on achieving global coverage, providing access to 
mass market applications, with a good basic level of safety for European transport operations, 
but with a minimum space infrastructure (allowing for augmentations to be developed where 
required to meet more stringent safety demands or for dedicated commercial applications). 
There are four types of orbit  for navigation  satellites which  could provide a homogeneous 
signal in space for a global service area (cf. annex I1 a)l6. 
The optimal system definition should take into account the different strengths of the different 
orbits to ensure performance in line with safety requirements and user demands, including the 
provision  of  integrity  data.  Precise  recommendations  will  be  made -through  the  ESA 
comparative study. However, at the present stage, it appears clear that thc core constcll'ation 
for Europe is likely to be a Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), representing low technical risk and 
known performance capabilities.  I 
The ME0 approach  was  adopted  by  both  the US  and  the  USSR  for  the  systems  they 
developed. It has proved very efficient and has been retained for later generations of the two 
systems,  including 'GPS Block  IIF  and  GLONASS M.  This  option,  therefore,  represents 
minimal  technical and industrial risk, in particular if Europe and the Russian.  ~edeiition  can 
build on each other's respective strengths and experience.  .  . 
The wide area augmentation services being developed by the US, Japan and Europe (WAAS, 
MSAS and EGNOS respectively) provide integrity checks and differential c~rrection'~  to the 
GPS signals; EGNOS in addition similarly augments GLONASS. They also provide a ranging 
signal. 
To date, the work led by ESA and with the close involvement of industry has focused on two  .  .  .  . 
broad options: 
e  a  core  constellation  of  21  MEO,  which  would  come  close  to  meeting  European 
requirements. Integration of GPS and local area augmentation in a total system approach 
could guarantee the European requirements, and 
l6  GNSS-2 Forum Technical and Financial Group Report, December 1998 
l7  Integrity can be defined as the level of confidence given to users that the calculated position corresponds to 
the data provided.-  it is based on ensuring users are alerted to errors through a warning message provided 
within a specified time; differential coriection means reducing the main sources of positioning error which 
result from the propagation of radio-waves through the ionosphere o  a  core  36  ME0 constellation,  which  would  meet  European  requirements  fully  and 
independently. 
Users will .require real time information on the health of the constellation (i.e. certainty that 
the signals are correct). The integrity message might, at least in  part, be delivered from the 
core ME0 constellation but  it is considcrcd at his  stagc that a complcment of  bctwcc11  3 'and 
9 GEO and/or IGSO satellites, which might  include the EGNOS satellites, will be needcdIx. 
The optimal  integration  of ground networks,  including those developed  for EGNOS and, if 
suitable agreements are reached, GLONASS, is also foreseen. The Galileo work programme 
will also need to cover a strategy for the problem of space debris. 
While  this  is  only  a  preliminary  sketch  of  Galileo,  the  basic  decision  on  European 
involvement in GNSS can already be taken since sufficient details of constellation parameters 
and  fairly  accurate budgetary  implications  are already known.  In.  addition  to  positioning, 
navigation  and  timing,  it  'is  anticipated  that  hosting  limited  navigation-related 
communications capabilities on Galileo could make safety critical services more reliable and 
generate revenue strearnsI9. 
,' 
4.2.  Security issues 
There' are clear security requirements relating to the physical protection of vital infrastructure 
(such as contro1,centres and communication networks) as well as with regard.to  the provision. 
of accurate navigation-  signals in times of tension or war. Further, protection against spoofing 
and other  forms of misuse and  interference with the signal  in  space needs  to be ensured. 
Conversely, it must be possible to.deny use of the system to enemy forces in a war situation. 
The systein design will need to take these general requirements into account. In addition, an 
.interference  monitoring  structure  and  an  interface  with  the  military  will  need  to  be 
established. The commission intends to have further exploratory discussions with a view to 
identifying  appropriate  partners  and  structures  for  this  interface,  in  accordance with  the  I 
recommendations  of  the  study  carried  out  for  the  Cornmission2() and  in- the  light  of 
international discussions and negotiations, and will make propo$als as soon as feasible in the 
framework of the Community common foreign and security policy, 
An approach favoured by experts in the GNSS-2 Forum was to develop a controlled access 
service. They-envisaged  that there would be universal access to a basic signal for mass-market  1 
applications.  There would also be a controlled access service, using a second signal, with 
guaranteed. availability and accuracy. It could also provide users with liability cover in case . 
the system failed to meet performances specified. The  controlled access could further satisfy 
To be confirmed during the definition phase  of the ESA GNSS-2 comparative study. The GNSS-2 ~oruh 
Technical and Financial Group Report, December  1998, identified a 36 ME0 + 9 GEO constellation as a 
baseline  to  meet  user  requirements  (9.1  metres  horizontal  and  vertical  accuracy,  without  local  area 
augmentation, 95% of the time). 
The technical and financial group of the GNSS-2 Forum considered these issues in depth. It was concluded 
that the options of hosting navigation payloads on communications satellites (i.e. 'piggy-backing')  and vice 
versa were unrealistic. Limited navigation-related communications capability could, by contrast, be feasible 
and provide added value. 
Civil-military interface for GNSS, January 1999 international commitments such as for safety-of-life services. For cxample, search and rcscuc 
operations could depend on this service in any circumstances. The service is seen as key to 
attracting private sector involvement in GALILEO and generating revenue . streams.  .  In  times 
of  serious  tension  or  conflict,  this  service  would,  however,  be  restricted  to  authorised 
categories of subscribers. 
All these security issues have implications for system design and need to be resolved before 
the test and validation (tendering and construction) phases of GALILEO can begin (altering 
the design and requiring re-deployment  of satellites and modification  of the ground segment 
need to be avoided).  Preliminary costings  for this are included  in  the financial  section  5.1 
below. 
4.3.  Requirements of GNSS Ground Network 
The  function  of  the  GNSS  ground  segment  is  to  provide  integrity  monitoring,  orbit 
determination and timing synchronisation and management of overall system operation. The 
ground  segment  for  EGNOS, currently being  implemented  as part  of the ~rans-~uropean 
positioning and navigation network, has been developed, to the greatest possible extent, to be 
reusable in a European GNSS-2 constellation. Additional  ground stations may  need  to be 
deployed outside the, EU to guarantee  good  global performance.  In  order to guarantee the 
* 
system  performance,  physical . security ,requirements must  be  taken  into  consideration. 
Examples may  include restricted  access to buildings,  dedicated communications networks, 
suitable power levels and encryption of ground - satellite links. 
In  addition to the  basic  Galileo  infrastructure, including the  related  ground  segment, the 
potential will exist to enhance the performance to attain higher precision and other dedicated 
services, in particular through' use of appropriate terrestrial infrastructure. Together, these .will 
contribute to the Trans-European positioning and navigation  network,  providing robustness, 
meeting special demands from particular  categories of user in defined areas and providing 
service where satellite technology cannot  provide  a cost-effective  solution. In essence, the 
intention of the proposed  European involvement in GNSS is not to attempt to achieve sole 
means of navigation for all phases of navigation from the basic satellite system alone. Rather, 
the GN$S architecture must be seen as a prime component of the positioning and navigation 
networks and integrated for optimum cost-effective use. 
4.4.  Signal structure 
The development of a new satellite constellation, designed for the twenty-first century, allows 
Europe to consider improving present signal structures to meet future user demands. The GPS 
signal is widely recognised by users as a satisfactory structure although it is not guaranteed 
and not always available. A European development would need,  from the mass-market  user 
point of view, to deliver a signal compatible and interoperable with GPS. Used together, the 
modernised GPS21  and enhanced European  signals should  provide  a better  service than  is 
21  On  25  January  1999,  US  Vice  President  Gore  announced  a  new  GPS  modernisation  initiative  in  a 
programme costing $400 million. This involves adding two new civil signals to hture GPS satellites. The 
initiative is seen by the US administration as.part of an on-going public-private effort. The. second civil 
signal will be  located  at  1227.60 MHz, along with  the  current military  signal, and will be  available for 
general use  in non-safety-critical applications. A third civil signal, for safety-of-life applications, will be 
located at 1  176.45 MHz, within the current aeronautical radio navigation spectrum. available from GPS alone. In order to optimise the EUropean Signal and reduce susceptibility 
to jamming and spoofing, careful selection of frequencies22 and transmission power will also 
be required. While the subject is highly technical, the essence is that dis.cussions are beginning 
-with the US  and with European industry to define the parameters ,within which Europe can 
develop  an  enhanced  signal  structure.  This  will  include  necessary  work  on  global 
standardisation of timing and geodetic references. 
Conclusion: Galileo should provide, as a mimianurn, th~ee-dimensional  performance 
over  landmasses,  accurate  to  better  than  10  metres  horizontally,  providing  a 
universal independent time reference on a global basis. A core ME0  constelllation is 
considered  to be the  most cost-effective  and  technically, proven  approach  for the 
initial deployment and provision  of a basic  service.  The constellation  needs to be 
fully  integrated '  into  a  cohesive  Trans-European  positioning  and  navigation 
network.  A  good  level  of .security and  controlled  access  signal  are  also  key 
features.  Adequate  long-term  spectrum  allocation  and  full- interoperability  and 
'compatibility with GPS are'critical. 
Given the present policy of the US to provide the basic. GPS signal free of charge, it would be 
illusory to imagine that Galileo could be developed and provided  exclusively by the private 
sector. As in a number of major infrastructure projects in the context of the Trans-European 
Networks, considerable public funding will need to be found.  For Galileo, this would  apply 
particularly  for the definition  and  test  and  validation phases,  when  basic  research, concept 
testing and development of the space segment would be carried out. 
This section of the paper sets out a three point financing plan: 
substantial financing at the European level, through the EU Budget, notably the Transport 
TEN, and through ESA; 
e  establishment of revenue streains, which is likely to require regulatory action ;  &d 
0  developing a public private partnership, to:deliver complementary finance and value for 
.  .  money. 
.  .  - 
5.1.  Estimated costs 
;  The cost of the-  space segment and the required ground infrastructure for a basic public service 
_  will  depend on the satellite' constellation.  There is still a range  of options to be evaluated 
before the optimum constellation to meet performance requirements can be defined. However. 
it is already possible to give a fairly accurate indication of the potential cost of Galileo23. 
22  Subject to agreements with the Russian Federation and the US, Galileo might transmit on two df the current 
GLONASS frequencies and one or more GPS frequencies. Use .of frequencies covered by  the European 
filings in the ITLJ will also be considered. 
'  23  The figures are summarised in Annex  I11  b. Work led by ESA and with close involvement of industry has focused on costing twobroad 
options (cf. section 4.2) 24: 
a 36 ME0 and 9 GEO constellation, costing around €2.2  billion  over the period  1999- 
2008, and 
o  a  21  ME0 and  3  GEO  constellation,  costing  €1.6  billion.  Integration  of  local  area 
augmentation25 in a total system approach could guarantee the European requirements. 
PI 
A satisfactory co-operation agreement with the US might, in  principle,  allow both  sides to 
consider reduced satellite constellations which together would guarantee the levels of service 
required  by  each  party.  Further,  co-operation with  the  Russian  Federation  in design  and 
implementation of Galileo dould reduce costs. 
Estimates for the introduction of a controlled access service, together with security and safety 
certification, suggest a need  for an  additional  budget  of between €600  million  and €750 
million. 
Thus the total cost of Galileo over the period  1999-2008 is currently estimated at between 
€2.2  and 2.95 billion, depending on extent of joint operation with GPS and use of terrestrial 
systems. Not all of this needs to be public funding if a PPP approach is adopted.' 
Recurring costs (operations and replenishment  costs corresponding to thc options dcscribcd 
above) amount to between €140  million and €205  million p.a., beginning in 2008. I-lowever, 
some  cost  savings  should  be  possible  when  current  alternative  navigation  aids  can  be 
decommissioned. 
5.2.  Sources of public funding for Galileo 
The case for a public contribution to Galileo has been made above. In principle, it would be  - 
possible  for  this  to  be  financed  from  national  budgets.  But  Galileo  is  a  key  part  of the 
Transport  TEN96 and  the  Common  Transport  Policy  and  an  essentially -Trans-European 
project, bringing direct benefits to all Member States (helping them meet their public service 
and  international obligations with  respect  to providing navigation  aids). This constitutes a 
strong case for funding at EU level.  . . 
At the European level, a number of possible financial sources can be identified: 
First, for infrastructure development and deployment, the Commission has, in  the context 
of AGENDA 2000, proposed  some €5.5  billion  for the Trans-European Networks. With 
N.B. the estimates are based on the assumption that research and development, deployment of the ground 
segment and operational costs are constant for all options. ' 
Local area augmentations required to meet performance targets for Galileo (reduced constellation) amount 
to an estimated €200 million (based on equipping 250 major cities). 
/ 
GNSS is clearly  identified  as a prime element of the positioning and navigation network and a project of 
common  interest  in  the  present  TEN-Transport  guidelines  (Decision  No  1692/96/EC of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 on Community guidelines for the development of the trans- 
European transport network; OJ. L 228 of 9 September 1996). the recent adoption of the common position on'lhe revised TEN financial regulation, multi- 
annual  indicative  programming  should  soon become  possible27. This should  create 'the 
stable  environment  needed  to  encourage  private  investment  and  support  market 
development. The Commission's  intention would be to propose in. its future multi-annual 
programme  to,'earmark around C500 million (which  is  10% of the budgetary  envelope 
proposed for the Trans-European Transport Networks) for Galileo and to report regularly 
to the Council and the European Parliament on the progress of the project. This is in  line 
with the Con~mission's  objective of giving greater relative priority to intelligent transport 
systems. 
Second,  within  the  overall  budgetary  envelope  envisaged  for  the  5th  Framework 
Pr~gramme*~,  the Commission considers that  around €120  million  could  reasonably  be 
found for. Galileo. The lifetime of the 5"'  Framework Programme is limited to 2002, and a 
continuation of funding beyond 2002 would be proposed, subject to evaluation of the 5*" 
Framework Programme. 
Third,  for  co-operation  with  the Russian  Federation  and  other countries  of the  former 
USSR, the Commission's TACIS programme offers possibilities of support in'the fields of 
training and conversion of industries from military to civil purposes. 
Fourth, ESA would, in the context of its institutional mechanisms, potentially  be able to 
mobilise funds of the same order as under the TENS. 
Thus, in total, up to €1.25  billion could be mobilised on the European  level for a Galileo 
programme for the period 2000-06, compared to a total cost ofE2.2 to 2.95 billion spanning 
2000-08. On the level of the EU, this would not involve the creation of a new programme but 
would  be  done by  earmarking  certain  sums  in  established  Community programmes.  ESA 
would have to launch a new programme. 
On  the basis of the estimates described above, a further sum of between €950  million and 
€1.70 billion  would be required (before taking account of potential  EU funding in 2007-8 
which is outside the current financing period).  A  number of options exist to mobilise this 
additional money: 
First  and  foremost,  the  identification  of  potential  revenue  streams  could  attract  the 
involvement of the private sector in Galileo. This might also allow the EIB, (and, in the 
case of a Euro-Russian co-operation, the EBRD),  to finance part of the project through 
long term loans; 
27  This should respond to the Opinion of the Parliament's Committee on Budgets that the lack of clear political 
direction and commitment from the European institutions had a detrimental effect. 
2"roposal  for  a  decision  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  covering  the  5th  Framework 
Programme of the European Union for research, technical development and demonstration activities (1998  . 
to 2002),  COM (97) 142 final. Use of the expertise or  the Joint Rcscarch Centrcs (in particular, ihc Space 
Applications  Institute) and actions under  the thematic programmes  'improving  the quality of life and the 
management  of living  resources'  and  'promoting  competitive  and  sustainable growth'  as, well. as  the 
horizontal programme 'confirming the international role of Community research' may be involved. o  co-operation  with  other  countries  may  allow  sIi:~ring 01'  COSLS  IWLWCCII  in~~r11;~Lioti;d 
partners; and 
'B  a number of Member States may be ablc to contribute individually; in particular to cnsure 
that aspects of the European GNSS which are security related are adequately handled. 
5.3.  Potential revenue streams enabling public-private partnership 
Revenue streams will reduce the need for public subsidy and facilitate PPPs.  Furthermore, the 
Parliament requested the Commission to investigate new and even unconventional methods to 
ensure that future users pay for GNSS services they receive29.  The Commission has, therefore, 
considered a number of potential sources of revenue streams. 
First, a possible revenue source relates to different levels of service (two or more signals 
from the space segment, one generally available, and one or more offering higher levels of 
service based on controlled access). Different receivers or smart cards would need to be 
developed for the different levels of service: 
- level 1  service to the mass market 
- level 2  -  a certifiable service 
- level 3  safety of life and security-related services. 
It is envisaged that level  1 services, consistent with present US policy on the equivalent 
standard positioning service of GPS and the Russian Federation's civil GLONASS signal, 
would  be  available free of charge.  Should the  US  and/or Russian  policy  on  charging 
change, the European position could be revised. 
Levels 2 and 3 would be controlled access services, available to subscribers in  return for 
certain  fees.  In  some cases,  the  use  of these  services might be  mandatory,  such  as in. 
connection with electronic fee collection for access to infrastructure or monitoring fishing 
activities, freight and coach transport and road safety services. It may be noted that IMO is 
requiring internationally-registered  ships to carry GNSS equipment from 2000 and GNSS 
is an integral part of the CNSIATM concept adopted by ICA030. 
Levels 2 and 3 could be made even more attractive if liability cover was provided for the 
services subscribers received. This would  in a way represent a form  of insurance which 
would allow Galileo users to rely on  services in a way which they could not do using the 
basic signal. Similarly, the fact that level  2 and 3 services could be certified for safety- 
critical and similar high-performance tasks (in a way that GPS could not) would constitute 
a marketable asset. Insofar as Galileo allows existing ground based air navigation facilities 
to be replaced and provides a better and more reliable service to airlines, it can be expected 
that airlines will contribute to the revenue stream. 
20  Opinion on the Commission's Communication of 21 January 1998 by the Committee on Budgets. 
30  Communication, Navigation, Suweillance/Air Traffic Management  / 
16 A second possibility would be a levy on receivers for all satellite-based radio-navigation 
services. This would need  to  be introduced throughout the  EU and be  applicable to all 
receivers sold in  or imported into the EU. The advantage of this levy would be to apply 
also to  the mass-market  (such as equipment  for in-car-navigation,  leisure activities, etc) 
and would therefore also cover level  1 equipment. This would be entirely in line with the 
general  Commission  philosophy  of  marginal  infrastructure  cost  charging  and  could be 
limited to very small sums. Issues of user acceptability would have to be dealt with by 
showing a  combination  of cost saving, and improved  service availability  particularly in 
urban areas. Funds received could contribute,  for example, to the cost of operating  and 
updating the system once in place. Levies are already used  in a large number of Member 
States for certain-  products,.inter  alia, 'for recording equipmcnl,  photocopidrs and  vidco 
cassettes. Equally, certain services, such as public television broadcasting, are also funded 
through mandatory uSer  charges. A levy of €20  on receivers  would  lead to receipts of 
€140-205  million annually and could go a considerable way to filling the financing gap for 
project  construction and development31.  It  would  also  be  conceivable  to  introduce, but 
probably more difficult to implement,' an annual operating license fee for the reception of 
satellite navigation signals. 
0  Equally,  the  private  sector  could  generate  revenue  through  wide-ranging  applications, 
facilitated  by  the  integration  of  communication  and  positioning,  including  dedicated 
navigation-related commerciaI and high accuracy services and integration of safety-related 
and  security-critical  payloads.  This  may  also  include  some  dedicated  communications 
payloads on some satellites. A number of these functions could be used to comply with 
public service obligations (such as search and rescue). A  'shadow toll model'  may be a 
way  of  guaranteeing  revenue  streams  to  a  private  operator.  Clearly,  giving  Galileo 
additional capabilities to support such services will have costs that need to be compared 
with the extra revenue generated. 
Annex  IV  gives  some  tentative  market  forecasts  for  Galileo,  which  indicate  the  broad 
prospects  for revenue from the sources identified in  this section. A number of these revenue 
streams, such as introducing levies and making certain uses of Galileo mandatory, depend on 
regulatory  decisions;  others,  such  as  controlled  access  and  encryption,  depend  on  the 
definition of the technical characteristics of the system. Moreover, a number of other possible 
revenue streams may only be identified over time since the market for satellite-applications is 
growing exponentially. Industry will, therefore, need to work further on this, in the context of 
the  overall  financing  package,  while  the  public  sector  will  need  to  address  the  related 
regulatory decisions. 
5.4.  Establishing a public private partnership 
As  in  other  TEN  projects,  there  is  significant  scope for  attracting  private  investment  to 
develop parts of the infrastructure, provided po&tial  revenue streams are clearly identified 
and there is a clear allocation of risks, which may involve Government guarantees. One aim 
should  be  for  public  sactor  funding  to  be  largely  replaced  by  private  funding  by  the 
operational phase. 
31  Assuming that by 2010 around 50% of new cars arc equippcd wilh a GNSS-bascd psiliming dcvicc. and 
with around 14 million car sales in Europe annually, a levy'of €20 would raise €140  million per year. 
, 
17 A PPP for Galileo could provide complementary finance, improve project design and ensure 
overall value for money. In particular, the need to encouragc take-up of thc service in ordcr to 
generate income and reach profitability  would  provide  a powerful  mechanism  for cnsuring 
users' needs are given central importance, while a PPP structure will help keep costs under 
control since much of the risk of construction cost over-run would normally fall on thk private 
sector. It  would  also reflect the  fact that  Gaiileo combines public service and comnlercial 
aspects. 
A PPP is therefore the recommended  approach. Indeed, this would be fully in line with the 
priority  given up to now to such an approach. The Commission Communication on PPPs32, 
which  was  broadly  endorsed  by  the  Council  and  the  Parliament,  sets  out  a  number  of 
important recommendations that are relevant for Galileo. These include: 
that private sector involvement should  begin at as early a stage as possible, so they can 
participate in project design; 
that the public sector should seek, as much as possible, to specify project requirements in 
terms of outputs (service levels) rather than detailed technical specifications; 
the  most  effective  structure  for  a  PPP  normally  involves  a  specially  created  vehicle 
company, clearly accountable for project delivery, and with the management autonomy to 
run an efficient project; and 
that risk should be allocated according to scope to control them. This would, for example, 
mean that the private sector should be responsible for construction cost over-runs, while 
the public sector would be responsible for cost increases caused by regulatory changes. 
These general principles need to be applied in a way that takes full account of the unique 
features of Galileo, including the public service component (safety of life services) and the 
security dimension. 
The ideal approach would be to set up a full PPP as soon as possible. This would mean the 
design-build-operate model but a significant amount of further work will be required in the 
following areas: 
more precise specification of performance requirements, based on users' needs; 
identifying  risks,  and how  they  should be allocated, so that private  sector investors can 
make a commercial judgement on the risklreward ratio; 
identification of revenue  streams, which means both more precise assessment of overall 
market potential  and market  segments likely to be willing to pay for a restricted  access 
service, and a commitment from the public sector to take the regulatory action necessary to 
secure these revenue streams (e.g. the levy). 
Each of these areas needs to be explored'in co-operation with the private sector. This would 
be a central part of the definition phase of the project, which is described more fully in the 
next section.. If this ambitious approach does not prove viable in good time (for example, if 
j2  COM (97)  453 final of 10 September 1997 
18 the public sector is unwilling to put revenue streams in placc), a more traditional modcl (with 
a Programme Development  Office  running  thc  project  through  conventional  public  works 
contracts) would be a pbssible fallback for the ii~itial  stages. Thc Programmc Devclopmcnl 
Office would be disbanded once .the vehicle company was in place for the deployment and 
operational phases. It shouldbe noted that, while the Commission is promoting the setting up 
of a PPP and a vehicle company, it would not engage itself in commercial business activities 
(these are not provided for in the Treaty): 
Conclusion:_As long as the US  continues to provide the basic GPS signal free of charge, 
public money will be needed to allow Galileo to be developed and provide a similar, free 
basic  public  service.  However,  a  number  of  potential  revenue  streams  have  been 
identified,  some of  which  depend  on  public  regulatory  action.. The Commission  will 
investigate,  together  with -ESA and the  EIB,  the potential  for  setting  up a  vehicle 
company already in the initial phase of the project. If this is not immediately possible, 
because of lacking public commitment to ensure the necessary framework conditions for 
revenue streams, a two stage approach would be proposed: the first, preparatory, stage 
would depend essentially on'public .financing (TEN, community Research Framework 
programmes,  ESA  and possibly  national'contributions)  disbursed  through  a  Project 
Development Office (risk would be shared through a tightly ~controlled.cost  contract with 
industry); the second, implementation, stage would imply much higher investment and 
commercial risk for the private sector. 
6.1.  Designing,  building  and operating Galileo:  basic  principles and immediate 
decisions 
.The  Commission's' Communication  of  January  1998  summarised  the  roles  and  . 
responsibilities  which  should  be  included  in  a  GNSS organisational  framework. The 
-  GNSS-2 ~okm  has further refined the work  on these questions.  Bearing in mind the  '  - 
Community' approach  of  separation  of  regulatory  and  operational  functions  and  the 
intention to build as much as possible on existing bodies and..structures, the Commission 
is proposing  the  following  preliminary  conclusions  (Annex I) sets out, in  schematic 
form, the stages of project development, which are referred to in the remainder of this 
section). 
It is, in this context, important to note that,  for a number  of questions, no  immediate 
answers need to be given. 
With  the  decision  to  go  ahead  with  the  Galileo  programme,  the  only  firm 
-' 
commitment  that needs to be  taken  is  to  set  up  the  appropriate structures  for the 
definition phase (i.e. up to December 2000). 
At  the same time,_the organisation of the remaining phases  needs to be prepared. 
Here,  the  Commission's  clear  intention  is  to  promote  a  PPP  and. to  undertake 
everything, including regulatory proposals, to make this possible, ideally from the 
beginning of the development stage, but in any case before the deployment phase. 
One of the immediate actions necessary is to ensure that appropriate frequencies are 
available.  . . 6.2.  Strategic Aspects  , 
The overall aim is to ensure that a robust structure is in  placc to takc strategic dccisions, 
oversee international negotiations, and control compliance of Galileo with international, 
Community and national regulations and policies. It is proposed that the EU institutional 
framework be used for this purpose, with the Commission providing the necessary input 
to the other institutions. This is a pragmatic  choice: given the wide range-  of sensitive 
political,  international,  economic,  industrial  and  security  issues  that  will  need  to  be 
balanced, only the EU institutional structures (and not exclusively the first pillar) appear 
suitable. 
The Commission (in certain cases, together with the Member States) should represent 
EU interests at the international level on the basis, where appropriate, of mandates from 
the  Council.  This  might  include  negotiating  global  standards  and  ensuring 
interoperability  and compatibility between  different  global  and regional  systems. This 
might then mean taking a central role in discussions on GNSS signal structures, a global  ' . 
methodology to achieve certification, a global liability regime, and in ensuring a global 
integrity monitoring network33. 
The GNSS High Level Gro~p3~  has proved useful over the last years and would have an 
important role  in  steering the Galileo programme:  i.e.  giving overall  direction  to  the 
programme, developing and monitoring the application of a European Radio-Navigation 
Plan35 and ensuring that strategic considerations, including those related to security36, are 
kept in view. This might  include policy on the Galileo controlled  access service. The 
Commission would ensure that an appropriate consultation platform exists for users so 
that policy recommendations reflect user demands 37. . 
6.3.  The development phase  .  . 
In  order  to  ensure  tight  control  on  costs  and  effective  use  of  public  resourceb,.  " 
considerable attention  needs to  be given  to  project  management.  A  sound  and stable 
structure needs to be established, identifying specific roles and responsibilities. 
For cost-efficiency, the ground network under definition  for EGNOS should be  integrated  with  Europe's 
needs  for GNSS-2. curther, appropriate political choices of location.  01'  inliastructure are important.  It is. 
therefore,  proposed that the Commission  includes  this aspect in  its discussions  with  third countries  (cf. 
paragraph 2.4). 
The High Level Group was set up under Council Resolution 941C 379102 of 19 December 1994; OJ C. 379 
of 3 1 December 1994. 
Providing  expert  input on the development  of an  appropriate  network  of terrestrial  and  satellite-based 
systems, fully taking into account the capabilities of different components and the need for safe and cost- 
efficient transition in accordance with Article 17 of the Trans-European Network Guidelines. 
cf. GNSS-2 Forum, working group 3, report on security issues. 
It is envisaged that the user group established under the Commission's  GNSS-2 Forum should develop into 
a permanent users'  forum One important element of this would be to examine the possibility of the EU and ESA, 
together  with  any  other  contributors,  pooling  financial  resources  (c.f.  annex  I).  The 
purpose  of this  would  be  to  insure that  Galileo  is run  from  the  outset  as  a  single 
integrated project. Advice on this will be sought from the EIB. 
.A  programme  management bourd, consisting of the Commission, ESA, national space 
agencies  and  other  investors,  would  need  to  be  set  up,  to  put  in  place  the  vehicle 
company through public tender; in  the period before the vehicle company is  in  place, it. 
would approve choices ofcontractors and monitor  compliance with contracts. 
The overall  execution  of the project  would'be managed  and carried.out by  a vehicle 
company which might include the primary industrial contractors of the Galileo project. 
This would act in accordance with a contract (possibly to design, build and operate the 
systein) a key  element  of which  would be  the  financial p,rovisions relating to  public 
subsidy and availability of revenue streams. It would, in principle, be responsible for any 
cost overruns. 
In  the  definition  phase,  before  the  vehicle  company  is  set  up,  the  programme 
management board would need technical support. Since this stage is imminent, this could 
be provided by a technical task force, which might consist of experts from ESA, national 
space  agencies,  the  Commission, potential  service  providers  and,  as  required, .other 
organisations. 
If it is not possible to set up the vehicle company in time to manage the subsequent phase 
(i.e. development) of the project, the technical task force would need to be given more 
formal  status,  perhaps  as  Programme  Development  Office.  Its  role  would  be  to  co- 
ordinate planning and development of the space and ground infrastructure. The office 
would  need  to  ensure  that  user  demands  and  requirements  for  development  of 
applications,  as  well  as the  possibilities  for  integration  with  local  area  systems  and 
GNSS-1 infrastructure, are important service drivers and are fully taken into account in 
the Galileo project. 
The Programme Development Office would be disbanded once the vehicle company was 
in place. 
6.4.  The Operation phase 
6.4.1.  Galileo management 
,To manage  the  operation of Galileo, the  Commission  would  propose  a  small public 
structure  in  the  form  of  a  Galileo  Administration.  This  would,  in  essence,  be  the 
successor of the Programme Management Board, responsible for ensuring the operation 
of Galileo, while contracting out actual operations, This would have to be established by 
Council decision as it would need to have legal personality in orderto deal, for example, 
with  liability  issues. Such  a permanent  structure  should  boost  public  confidence  and 
encourage  industry  to  develop  applications  (so  facilitaling  private investment  and 
revenue streams). While the size of the Administration  and the tasks to be carried out are not  yet  fully 
',  defined for Galileo, the equivalent structure should be in operation, initially for EGNOS, 
by the end of the year 200038. 
Tasks  which  might  be  assigned  could  include  liaison  with  the  different  international 
organisations3~nvolved  in GNSS exploitation. It might also have a role in establishing 
,  an  international integrity monitoring network and establishing appropriate relationships 
with providers of specific augmentation services, such as in the northernmost latitudes. It 
could also accept responsibility for peacetime co-ordination and liaison, as appropriate, 
with defence and security .organisations, including NATO and the WEU, the Conference 
on Security and  Co-operation in Europe, Interpol  and Europol, and  ensure respect of' 
arrangements related to nuclear missile and non-proliferation regimes. In practice, its role 
i.  would  then involve management  of encryption related to the controlled  access service 'i 
and  the  definition  of  responses  to  possible  security  incidents,  including  rcal  timc 
' 
,  . 
'j  dissemination  of  information  related  to  interference.  With  respect  to  liability,  the 
Administration would be responsible for dealing with any claim relating to Galileo. 
5  6.4.2.  Galileo operation 
.:  7 
$. 
!r  The Commission considers that the private sector could, by way of concession, perform  ' 
,the main fimctions of a Galileo opeiator. If the approach to establish a PPP to design, 
build and operate the system is accepted, this function would be carried out by the same 
,$:,vehicle  company  responsible  for  putting  the  system  in  place.  The vehicle  company 
'would then have responsibility for running the system on a sound economic basis40, and.;:., 
integrating  new technology,  where appropriate, to  improve services and adapt to  new  ,  ,"  . 
user demands. It would also be possible to contract out operation of the system to the  1,; 
private sector even if earlier stages do not involve a PPP. 
.  .i 
6.5.'  Securing Radio Spectrum 
Securing radio  spectrum availability  is a pre-condition  to  implementing  Galileo  and  .  ,  , 
ensuring its interference-free operation. 
Frequency  allocation  decisions  at  the  global  level  are  taken  at  ,World 
Radiocommunications~ Conferences  (WRCs),  organised  under  the  auspices  of  the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) with its 186 Member Countries. ~uropean 
positions  for WRCs are developed and negotiated within the framework of the CEPT 
(European  Conference  of  Postal  and  Telecommunications  Administrations)  which  . 
.. . 
38  If  this  time  scale  is  not  possible,  the  EGNOS  Operations  and  Infrastructure  Group  currently  being 
established should be able to assume the management responsibilities for EGNOS. In the case of EGNOS, 
however, there is currently no plan for a vehicle company to operate the system, so the  EGNOS equivalent 
.  of the Galileo Administration would have a wider role. 
39  11t  might  thus  benefit  from  the  wider  membership  and  ties  of  these  organisations  undcr  international 
agreements. 
40  Charging policy  might be subject to approval by the Galileo Administration  on the basis of Community 
guidelines and regulatory acts; fee collection would be the responsibility of the operator under concession. comprises  43  European  countries  and "therefore  potentially  leads  to  harmonised 
frequency allocations beyond the Community borders41. 
It is essential to develop a common ~uro~ean  position so as to ensure that the frequency 
requirements for GNSS and Galileo are recognised and met within ITUiWRC as well as 
in the framework of the CEPT. As described in the recent Green Papefi2, there are wide- 
ranging and increasingly conflicting interests and a large number of actors involved in 
the preparation  for the WRCs; The Commission would therefore recommend that, with 
regard. to  CEPT,  consideration  be  given  to  reaching  political  and  legal  agreement 
through European Parliament and Council Decisions.  h his would follow the precedent 
set  in  the  case  of  the  harmonised  introduction  of  mobile  and .satellite personal 
communicationssystems in the Community43. 
Further, especially as CEPT is in a minority within ITU, education and awareness actions 
will play a vital  role in  securing the frequencies that  will  permit Galileo to come into 
service; as well  as in  generating the potential  market for Galileo. Alliances with  like- 
minded countries and blocks should thus be sought for the WRCs. 
As the US  is also particularly  concerned about protection  of present radio-navigation 
satellite  frequencies  (GPS and GLONASS) in view of the  forthcoming discussions at 
, 
WRC 200044,  'there is an opportunity for co-operation and agreement which should be 
taken  into  account  in establishing  a mandate  for international  GNSS negotiations. In 
advance of this,  early technical  discussions with the US may be critical to defining a 
jointly  acceptable approach. and protecting European industry's  opportunities in GNSS 
with new equipment and service design. Similar considerations apply with the Russian 
Federation, especially if Galileo is built jointly, using the GLONASS frequency band. 
The Community has the status of observer within IrfU/WIIC  and counsellor to CEPT, providing infomation 
on the Community policies and their spectrum requirements. See further information in the Communication 
from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  Council  on  the  World  Radiocommunications 
conference  1997  (WRC-97),  COM  (97)  304  final,  18  June  1997,  and  Communication  from  the 
Corqnission to the European Parliament and the Council on radio frequency requirements for Community  - 
policies  in the context of the World Radiocommunications  Conference 1999 (WRC-1999),  COM (1998).  - 
298 final, 13 May 1998. 
Green  Paper  on  Radio  Spectrum  Policy  in  the  context  of  ~uro~ean  Community  policies  such  as 
teleco,mmunications, broadcasting, transport and R&D; COM (1998) 596 final, 9 December 1998 
Decision No 710197iEC ,of the European Parliament and Council Decision on a co-ordinated authorisation 
approach in the field of satellite personal-communication  services-in the Community, OJ L 105/4, 23 April 
1997. Decision No  .  .  ./98/EC of the European Parliament and Council on the co-ordinated introduction of a 
third  generation mobile  and  wireless  communication  system (UMTS)  in  the Community. .Under these 
Decisions, CEPT is mandated to harmonise frequencies and authorisation conditions for UMTS and S-PCS; 
where work by CEPT or the implementation by Lhc  Member States is not satisfaciory, further action at the 
Community level shall be taken. 
The next WRC will be held in  lstqnbul between  8 May and 2 June 2000 (WRC-2000).  Onc item on  the 
agenda  is  allocation  of  spectrum  for  GNSS  and  other  radio-navigation  satcllitc  scrviccs.  CliP'l'  has 
provisi6naily accepted the need to protect the current spectrum for radio-navigation satellite services. Generally, international  law provides  a framework  for regulation  of critical  activities 
(e.g. relating to safety, industrial  standards, environment and implementation of public 
policy) which  is implemented  in  more detailed national  legislation. For navigation,  a 
regulator  is  necessary  to  ensure  that  systems  and  related  services  meet  the  legal 
performance 'requirements set, most notably for safety. At this stage, decisions on GNSS 
navigation, positioning and timing regulation clearly remain at national  level or within 
the Community and international entities which are under definition (e.g. EASA45) and 
regulatory  audit  conclusions  will  need  to  be  referred  to  the  national  regulators  for 
approval. 
Consideration needs to be given to whether there is a need, beyond the already existing 
co-ordination function that the Commission has, to set up a European GNSS Regulatory 
Co-ordinator, taking responsibility for the development of standards, where required (for 
example for certification or type approval), for Galileo and  other parts  of the  Trans- 
European Positioning and Navigation Network46:  In  some cases, this may require  the 
creation of new centres of expertise to develop standards47; in others, existing bodies will 
be able to support the work.  The standards developed  could  then be incorporated  into 
regulation  by  the  appropriate  bodies  (e.g.  ICAO,  IMO,  ISO,  CENELEC,  IEC, 
EUROCONTROL  and  ETSI). The Regulatory  Co-ordinator will  also be able to offer 
system  performance  monitoring  so  that  -Member States  can  ,be assured  that  their 
obligations are satisfied. This structure would also have an important role to promote the 
introduction of harmonised regulatory performance requirements across transport modes 
and'between user groups. 
The role of regulatory co-ordination can, at this stage, be performed by a specialist group ' 
of national experts nominated by the Member States, with the support of observers, as 
required,  from  other  organisations  and  disciplines  (e.g.  national  regulators;  relevant 
international  and  Community  regulatory  entities;  European  standardisation  bodies;,  . 
agriculture, Customs  and  fisheries  authorities; security-related  activities  organisations 
and third countries). It will monitor the work of the Programme Management Board. 
A  future  Regulatory  Co-ordinator  might,  at  a  later  stage  and  particularly  when  the 
Galileo  Administration  becomes  established  and  needs.  regulatory  support,  be 
empowered to develop mandatory standards to be implemented by all Member States to 
Draft recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the Commission to start negotiations with a view 
to establish a European Organisation responsible  for civil aviation safety, SEC 2152,  16 December  1996. 
While it is noted that, in the field of civil aviation and safety regulation, the emerging European .Aviation 
Safety Authority (EASA) is mode-specific, input from EASA will be an important element in the definition 
of the GNSS safety policy. 
Including  wide  and  local  area  augmentations  making  use  of  the  satellite-based  infrastructure  (e.g. 
,  .  differential sistems, such as DGPS, DGLONASS and Eurofix) 
This conclusion was drawn in a study carried out on behalf of the Commission and entitled 'Study to Devise 
a  Legallcertification  Framework  for  a  Satellite-Based  Navigation  and  Positioning  Service  (CLAIM 
GNSS),' September 1998. satisfy the objectives of \he Trans-European Positioning and Navigation Network.  This 
'  would need to be sct  in a way (hat docs not conflict with thc  'l'rcaly. 
* 
Conclusion: the following organisational structure is proposed: 
For strategic decisions to be taken at EU level, .with the Commission taking its usual 
role, supported by the GNSS High Level Group. 
during the preparatory and implementation phase 
, 
an  appropriate  programme  management  structure  through  a  Programme 
Management Board supported initially by a technical task force, and subsequently 
granting a concession to a Vehicle company; 
in the operations phase, 
a small GALILEO Administration, working with the vehicle company to manage 
the provision of satellite-based navigation services and guarantee performance, as 
well as ensuring peacetime defence and security co-ordination 
for regulatory issues 
a  GNSS  Regulatory  Co-ordinator  to  develop. mandatory  standards  to  ,be 
implemented by all Member States to satisfy the objectives of the Trans-European 
Positioning and Navigation Network. 
7.  THE  FEASIBILITY  OF,  AND  POSSIBLE  PARTNERS  FOR,  A  JOINT  DEVELOPMENT  OF A 
SYSTEM: CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS 
Negotiations will  be necessary  in  order to conclude agreements  with  international partners, 
including potentially  those hosting terrestrial  in frastri~cturcs,  Thc Comn~ission  will  proposc 
negotiating guidelines in  each case, tailoring thc content and scopc to  thc naturc of the co-  '  . 
operation envisaged with the different countries (industrial, political  and security issues): The 
aim will be to  ensure that' Europe's  interests are safeguarded  in  the international  field, as 
requested by the Parliament in its January 1999 ~esolution. 
In the  immediate  future,  only  two  decisions  - to  open negotiations with the  US  and  the 
Russian  Federation  -  will  be sought from  the  Council.. Further  technical  discussions  will 
continue to take place whilst the ~duncil  is  considering the proposed  recommendations for 
decisions  and  the  negotiating  guidelines.  With  other  countries,  such  as  Japan,  further 
exploratory talks are necessary. 
As -to the  US,  the  Commission will  propose  to  the  Council  to  open  negotiations  on the 
assumption that Europe will develop a global constellation fully compatible with GPS. Europe 
should  seek  maximum  involvement  in  the  GPS  modernisation  programme (including the 
evolution of the signal' structure) and the future development of a global  integrity network. 
Equally, an agreement with the US would need to contain provisions  Tor  an appropriate joint  . 
. 
management  board  responsible  for  co.-ordination  of  policy  and  technical  issues  (signal  , 
structure, integrity networking, etc). The negotiation would also need to consider development 
25 of a dispute settlement mechanism and any further requirements which may emerge from the 
ESA comparative study. The US has also made  it clear that they could consider increasing. 
European insight and input into the operation  and management of GPS civil functions (e.g. 
through  civilian  representation  at  the  civil  GPS  augmentation  centres);  reciprocally, 
equivalent treatment of the US within Galileo would be expected. 
With  the  Russian, Federation,  the  Commission  will  propose  to  the  Council  to  open 
negotiations on an agreement with a view to developing a joint  Euro-Russian Galileo. The 
agreement would need to reflect the gradualist approach set out in section 3.2 above. On the 
scenario of joint  development, there would need to be provision  for the creation of a joint 
steering  committee  to  approve  development  of  an  appropriate  signal  structure  and  co- 
ordination of policy  and technical issues, including co-ordinated  infrastructure planning to 
ensure  cost-effective  transition  and  deployment  of  the  future  positioning  and  navigation 
-  networks. Respective rights and obligations under a joint development programme would also 
need  to  be  agreed  in  detail,  including  dispute  settlement  procedures  and  authorised 
interlocutors48. Security concerns would need to be addressed. 
The scope of co-operation with the Russian Federation will have important implications for 
other  aspects of project  development,  notably  financing  and  organisational  structures, and 
negotiations will need to clarify what is realistic in  kood time for the necessary decisions in 
these areas. 
8.  THE  WAY  FORWARD  :  IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY 
In  line  with  the  conclusions  of the  above  sections,  the  following  scheme  to  develop  a 
European  GNSS-2  constellation  (Galileo)  is  recommended.  It  is  envisaged  that  the  EU 
Council of Ministers,  and  perhaps the European  Council, will  take decisions on the main 
issues by the end of Jane. The European parliament also has a crucial role to play.  Within this 
framework, the meeting of the ESA Council in May should provide clarification of the role 
ESA can play in the technical, financial and organisational development of Galileo. 
The decisions  should cover the whole period,  including the operations  phase.  However, a 
major milestone will be reached by the end of 2000 when it will be possible to review these 
orientations. 
setting 'the  strategy -in  motion 
A decision is needed now that Europe will develop Galileo, in  order to provide the pblitical 
commitment necessary for industry to invest, to allow Europe to negotiate the parameters of 
the  system  with  its  international  partners  and  to  ensure  that  Europe  is  able to  exert  an 
influence in the development of this strategic market. This commitment could take the form of 
a European  Council  orientation to treat  Galileo as a key  TENS priority,  in line with  the 
48  It  will  be  important  that  Europe  is  fully  aware  of  the  various  responsibilities  of  its  Russian  partners, 
including  industry,  the  Russian  Space  Agency  and  the  Ministry  of  Defence.  The  development  of 
Intemavigatsia as an industrial-financial consortium, responsible under its charter, inter alia, for developing 
the use of GLONASS for civil users (per decisi0.n of the Government of the Russian Federation, No 1435 of 
15 November  1997).  and developing navigation  systems within  the  framework of the  European  GNSS 
programmes, may provide helpful focus and coordination. -.  recommendation  of the  European  Parliament.  This  pol.itical commitmenl  will  necd  ti  bc 
translated into a number of specific decisions set out below. 
The main features of.the recommended Galileo are: 
it  must be an open,global system,-fully compatible with GPS, but  independent fr6m it, 
with a significant role for the Russian Federation; 
it should be based on medium Earth orbit JMEO) satellites, and would include a restricted 
access  service.  But  decisions  now  should  not restrict  the  scope  to  adapt  design  to 
.  .  technological progress; 
it should be developed as a public private partnership, with significant funding at-  European 
level (EU and ESA), and development of new revenue streams. 
/ 
financing Gqlileo 
This'Communication has identified the potential cost of Galileo and the options for financing 
it, on the basis that, with the GPS signal currently available fi-ee,' significant public finance 
will be needed. It is not necessary or possible, now, to make final decisions on the exact split 
between different sources of finance, but endorsement is sought for each of the aspects of the 
financing approach. 
First, a significant allocation of EU funding now will give the project a solid foundation. This 
requires a number of specific decisions:  . 
P 
- appropriate funding for TEN-T in Agenda 2000 on the basis of the  omm mission 
proposal and the Parliament's opinion 
- adoption  of the  revised  TEN  financial  regulation  with  provision  for multil'. 
annual programming and the possibility to goup to 20% funding for projects of  . 
European interest, such as Galileo  .  , 
C 
Council and Parliament endorsement of the proposed allocation of €500 n~illion 
for Galileo in the transport TEN multi-annual  programme 
- Council and Parliament recommendation to the Commission to facilitate the use 
of.5th Framework Programme resources of around € 120 million for th.e Galileo 
development 
Second, on revenue streams: 
-,  a decision is needed  on whether to pursue the option of a levy on receivers, 
which could make a significant contribution to financing the project. 
- other revenue streams are reliant on the extent to which specialised users will 
pay  for a better quality,  guaranteed  or certified  service.  The Commission  is 
setting up  a  Special Task Force,  led  by  the private  sector, to  carry  out  the 
substantial further work nceded to look into this. Once revenue streams which 
would allow the establishment of a PPP and  nccds for  regulatory action have 
been  identified,  the  Comrniss~on  could  be mandated  to  develop appropriate 
proposals. Third: 
- endorsement of a PPP approach. As well as helping to improvc valuc Tor  nioncy 
and giving users'  needs a central role, this will be a clcar signal that thc privalc 
sector  should confirm  its own  commitment  to  the  project  by  investing  risk 
capital in it. Setting up a PPP will require a significant amount of hrther work 
on  performance  requirements,  risk  allocation  and  revenue  streams,  which 
.  should be a priority for the definition phase. 
0  managing the development of Galileo 
The definitive organisational structure does not need to be decided now. The first priority is to 
make clear arrangements for the definition phase (June 1999 to December 2000). This means: 
-,  confirming  that -the key  strategic  decisions  should  be  taken  in  the  EU 
institutional framework (and not  solely the first pillar), with the GNSS High 
Level  Group to support the Commission by giving strategic orientations and 
accompanying  the  development  of  the  Galileo  programme,  including  the 
international discussions and negotiations 
- putting in place a Programme Management Board, chaired by the Commission, 
to  develop  an  appropriate  programme  management  structure  (involving  a 
vehicle  company),  to  co-ordinate  research  and  development  for  Galileo,  to 
finalise performance requirements and to establish, on the basis of private sector 
input,  a  business  case  for  the  public  private  partnership.  This  would  be 
supported by a technical task force in the definition phase. On the basis of the 
work  of  the  project  Management  Board,  the  Commission  would  make 
recommendations to the Council  and Parliament, at the end of the definition 
stage, allowing firm decisions on programme structure and financing 
As far as the long-term organisational structure is concerned, the Commission envisages  a 
Galileo Administration in the operations phase to  manage  (through the vehicle  company)  '  , 
provision of satellite-based navigation services and guarantee these services and performance. 
The Commission will also need to develop further the concept of regulatory co-ordination, 
, 
based on existing regulatory structures 
establishing the international environment 
There is a need to go beyond the exploratory~stage  in discussioris with the US andfthe  Russian 
Federation. Key decisions in the definition phase depend on the nature of 'the commitments 
our partners are willing to make. The Commission intends to submit, as soon as possible, the 
negotiating guidelines foreshadowed in this Communication for endorsement by the Council. 
Exploratory discussions with other countries will also nccd to take placc, to assess thc scope 
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I  /. 
Notes:  Ideally Vehicle Company should be  in place atoutset of test and validation phase. 1f this is not possible, thetechnical task force would have to become a Project Development 
'  .  Office to run the project initially.  ,  . Annex 11 a):  Main Characteristics of Orbits Considered for Galileo 
Several different scenarios could be envisaged for the Galileo space segment. Thc choicc 
of  orbit  or  the  combination  of  orbits  results  from  a  compromise  betwcen  differcnr 
parameters, such as number of satellites, coverage, cost, ground segment required, ctc. 
LEO (Low Earth Orbit) 
-  The LEO approach (up to 2000 km) has prcviously becn chosen for numcroils personal 
telecommunications constellations, including Globalstar and  Iridium, as well as for the 
Transit system for navigation. Its main advantages come from the low cost of receivers 
and satellite payloads. However, the orbital period is 45-80 minutes, with each satellite in 
view only for a short period (approximately 15 minutes). A large number of satellites is 
therefore required. 
ME0  (Medium Earth Orbit) 
The  ME0 approach  (between  5000  and  20,000  km)  was  selected  for  GPS  and 
GLONASS. Both operate in circular orbits around 20,000 km, leading to two complete 
orbits per satellite per day(orbital period of 12 hours). The launch cost is higher than for 
LEO satellites but the number of satellites required is lower. 
GEO (Geostationary Earth Orbit) 
GEOs (at 36,000 km  in the  Equatorial planc) havc bccn  uscd  Tor  tclcco~nm~~~iications, 
television and thc navigation satellite system augnicntations hcing devclopcd by thc US, 
Europe and Japan (respcctivcly, WAAS, EGNOS and MSAS). I1 involvcs a circular orbil 
of a period of 24 hours, so that they appear to  be  stationary over a lixed point on the 
Earth's  surface.  However,  a  principal  disadvantage  is  that  high  latitudes  are  poorly 
covered. Further, the cost of the satellites and launches is relatively high. 
IGSO (Inclined Geosynchronous Orbit) 
IGSOs (which are a variation on the GEO approach, similarly at 36,000 &m) follow a 24 
hour circular period orbit, inclined at the Equatorial plane. This facilitates coverage of the  .  . 
polar regions. No IGSOs have yet been brought 'into commercial application. The cost of  .  '  , 
.  .  the satellites and launches is relatively high.  . .  .  ..  . 
< ANNEX H1.b):  ACRONYMS 
,_.  .  .  Global systems-  .  . 
I requirements of civil users for position,,velocity and 
GNSS: 




a world-wide position, velocity and time determination 
systcni which r~rllils  on a pcr~nancnt  basis potcntjal uscr 
requirements for civil applications 
an initial implementation of GNSS, based on GPS  and  . 
GLONASS augmented by civil systems (such as 
, EGNOS, WAAS and MSAS) 
.  . 
a second generation system which meets the 
I signal structure. It will be integrated with aUgrnentations 
GBS: 
(Global Positioning System) 
GLONASS: 
(Global Navigation Satellite 
System.) 
"GALIEEO" 
and terrestrial systems to form the trans-European 
positioning and navigation network. 
..  .  ' .  . .,, 
'  .  ...-  .  ..  Regiqnal augmeptations, :. .,;;  ;,,  .  ,  , , ,'  .  .  . ..  -  . . . . .  -.  .  .. . ,.  .  ..  ..  ,. ; 
b ,.<",  :..=':: ; ;<.:*  :, . '  .>. .;. \..  .. .'\,.  . .,,.$<"  .;  ...:  ".  .t..  ;;., .',.  ">;'  ', 
de~ipne~:,tg;~r~~~~gifi<~~~~:~.~~-s~fic~~~~t~  ..,..,.,.  .  I  , :. ' i~~&p~~~i~t~m6~t~iin~~~~f.t~k~~h:~1di~~s't~~~:'  , :,a<k4.  .,.  , ,..  '7  ::I  . .  ,>  ,,*,  ( ,: ,  ,  . ,!: X, L ::-  , .  :  .: ,  . :  :.-...  .  $::>;  +: ; .:, :L..T?;;.!  ,:, 
;  c;!;,  ':..',,a  , ...~  ,.,.  as well as~additional:.precin  'hdd  satellite'  ,.< .  availability,;:'  ,.:.'  ,: : '. :'"  ,  ..  ...  .  a,,  + ,.:.  .  ..  *.-  .%:  ., .-.  .  .  ..  .. 
EGNOS:  I multi-modal augmentation of GPS and GLONASS being. 
time determination and is capable of providing a sole 
means of navigation for defined applications 
. 
satellite positioning system developed, owned and 
operated by the US Department of Defense 
satellite positioning system developed by the USSR and 
now operated by the Russian Federation (currently the  , 
Ministry of Defence) 
proposed European contribution to GNSS-2 based on a 
satellite constellation,.fully interoperable with the GPS 
(Europeari Geostationary  I developed by  Europe. EGNOS will, as appropriate, be 
Navigation Overlay Service) 
MSAS: 
(MTSATI  Satellite-based 
(Wide Area Augmentation  ]  aviation by the US Federal Aviation Administration 
integrated into Galileo: 
regional augmentation of GPS being developed for civil 




regional augmentation of GPS being developed for civil. 
(Local Area Augmentation  'I 
applications, such as precision navigation (e.g. to support 
System)  aircraft landing and ship docking) or enhancement of 
System) 
LAAS: 
(  satellite signals where necessary because of geography 
local augmentation, generally required for specific .  . 
I (e.g. the high latitudes). These may-form sub-regional. 
1  GLONASS) calculated at ground stations and broadcast 
Differential GNSS: 
(  to provide local or wide area enhancements of services 
networks. 
a correction of basic satellite signals (currently, GPS and 
-  .  . 
, ..  ,  . 
MTSAT: Multi-functional Transport Satellite 
.  . ANNEX 111 a):  '  FINANCIAI,  S'TA'I'~~MISN'I'  . 
Communication  from  the  Commission:  "Galileo  - involving  Europe  in  a  new 
generation of satellite navigation services" 
B5-700  Financial  support for projects of common  intercst  in  the trans-European  . 
network 
B6-6  Fifth  Framework  Programme,  Information  Society  Technologies  (6- 
6 12  1) and Sustainable and Competitive Growth (6-6 13  1) 
Other budget headings will be used as appropriate. 
One or more of the following depending on the actions undertaken: 
Articles 74, 84(2), 1 13, 129c and 130i oT thc Treaty. 
Decision No 1692196lEC of the European  Parliament  and of the Council of 23 July 
1996 on Community guidelines for the development of the trans-European  transport 
network. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2236195 of 18 September 1995 laying down general rules 
for the granting of Community financial aid in the field of trans-European networks 
(and proposed  amendment to Council Regulation  2236195 laying down general ruies 
for the granting of Community financial aid in the field of trans-European Networks, 
COM (98) 723 final, 4 December 1998). 
Other relevant documents 
Communication from the.Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - 
'Towards a Trans-Europcan positioning and navigation nctwork: including a ~bro~can 
5 
Strategy for Global Navigation Satclli tc Syslcms (GNSS)' 
Council Conclusions of 17 March 1998 on a European Strategy for ~lobal'Navigation 
Satellite Systems (GNSS) 
European  Parliament  report  of  ~~nuary  1999 on  a  European  Strategy  for  Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)  .  . 
Annex 111:  1 4.1.  General objective 
The  ~ommunication  proposcs  a  fol'low-up to  thc  stralcgy  dcvclopcd  in -the 
Commission's  Communication  '~owards  a  Trans-European  positioning  and  ' 
navigation  network:  including  a  European  Strategy  for  ~lobal  Navigation- 
Satellite Systems (GNSS)' (COM (98) 29,finai of 21 January 1998). It envisages 
development  of a European satcllitc systcm (Galilco) which 'will  contributc to 
the implementation of a trans-European positioning and navigation nclwork. The 
objective of establishment  of such  anetwork is  to  improve the efficiency of 
transport  systems  by  placing  at  the  disposal  of  users  a  system  allowing 
geographical positioning and precision timing. This contributcs.to dcvelopn~cnl 
of sustainable and safe mobility for persons and goods, one of !he  fundamental  .  .  . 
objectives of the Common ~rans~ort  Policy. The strategy also supports other 
~omrnunit~  policies such as for employment, industry, environment, cohe'sion 
and co-operation and development. 
More  specifically,  a  Galileo  would  provide  added-value  in  the. form  of  a 
-  controlled-access service, for which a high level of service would be guaranteed, 
making it more attractive to safety-critical and commercially-sensitive users. It  . 
. 
will also enable PPP structures to be developed, involving considerable private  ,  . 
investment in the development of a system required for public strategic reasons. 
,Different possible revenue streams are identified in the ~ommunication,  some of 
which  require  regulatory  action  (Commission  proposals  to  the  Community 
institutions). 
Galiled will  also, support  the acquisition  of a  share.of the rapidly  expanding 
global export market for European industry. 
.  . 
4.2.  Period covered and arrangements for renewal or extension 
Full implementation of Galileo is expected over the period 2000-08. This fiche 
considers only  EU Budget  financing  in the  current  finaricing period  (1999 -  , 
2006) (extension of provisions under future programmes succeeding the present  .  .  . 
TENS and Sh  Framework Programmes may be envisaged) ' 
I 
5.  CLASSIF~CATION  OF EXPENDITURE OR  REVENUE 
5.1.  Non-compulsory expenditure 
5.2. , Differentiated appropriations  . 
5.3.  Type of revenue involved 
,  . 
'Not applicable 
Annex 111:  2  -. 6.  TYPE  OF EXPENDITURE 
-  Subsidy  for joint  financing with  contributions  rrom  other  partics  (including  tl~c 
European Space Agency, industry, national space agencies); 
- Research and Development activities (Framework Programme) 
,,.. 
- Feasibility studies and demonstration projects (maximum Community coniribution: 
50%) eligible for financial aid under the TEN 
4 
- Grants or risk-capital participation for investment funds under the TEN 
- TACIS support for training and the conversion of Russian industries from military 
to civil purposes, in line with the Galileo programme 
.?? 
- Interest-rate subsidies, funded on European Investment Bank loans 
- Loan guarantees premium, oli European Investment Fund guarantees 
7.  FINANCIAL  IMPACT 
7.1.  The estimated cost of Galileo is between €1.6 -  2.2  billion. In  addition, costs 
will arise from the provision of a controlled access service, security and safcty 
certification  (approximately €600-750  million).  As  far  as the  EU budget  is 
concerned,  these  costs  will  be  met  from  resources  already  envisaged  in  the 
existing  financial programming,  mainly  for  TENs  and  the  Fifth  Framework 
Programme: TENs financing is an issue for the Agenda 2000 negotiations, the  , 
Fifth,Framework  Programme  has been  agreed.  The Communication  sets  out  . . 
other potential sources of finance. 










Total  Of  which: 
I GNSS-I  GNSS-2 I36-7 Fourth Framework 
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The total development cost of GaGleo, between now and 2008, is expected to be 
as follows': 
€ million' 







Su  b-total 
Certification 
Security 
Contro'lled Access Service 
TOTAL 
I  A more detailed breakdown of costs is attached at Annex 111 b). 
These figures are based on a constellation of 2 1 ME0 and 3 GEO satellites. The overall development  .  , 
costs might be reduced through technical cooperation with the Russian ~ederation. For the fixed costs, the following indicutivc sou~~ccs  ofrcvc~~uc  al Europcan lcvcl 
have been identified in the period 2000-6 only: 
I 
TOTAL  11240 
Sources of Finance for Fixed Costs 
ESA3 
EC 
Of  which: 
TEN-Transport 
FP5 + FP64 






I  I  million (current prices) 
Breakdown  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Total 
TENS (B5-700)  70  70  70  80  70  70  70  50'0 
~eGarch  (B6-6;  30  30  30  30  120 
IT5 onb) 
Total  30  10  100  00  80  70  70  70  tbd  tbd 
The  annual  breakdown  of  financing  is .provisional,  and  will  depend  on  both  the 
phasing of the project and the availability of hnding.  .. 
8.  FRAUD  PREVENTION MEASURES 
The  fraud  prevention  measures  contained  in  each  of  the  instruments  which  are  .  ,  ' 
proposed  to  finance the  different  operations  will  apply.  These include inspections,  ,' 
reporting,  monitoring and evaluation under ~egulation  2236/95, as amended, laying 
.  ' 
down general rules for the granting of Community  financial aid  inthe field of trans-  .  ,  . 
European networks:  in particular,  Articles  12(4) and (5) provide  for regular on-the-  ,  . 
spot checks by Commission staff and Articles  15(5) and (7) 'provide for monitoring 
.  . 
.  . 
.and evaluation.  Similar measures exist for the other Community financial instruments  . . 
involved. 
9.  ELEMENTS  OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
9.1.  Specific and quantified objectives; target population 
The development of a Galileo would require significant investment, from both 
the public  and private  sectors.  However, the strategic importance of such an 
3  Subject to ESA approval procedures. 
4.  This assumes a continuation of funding by the Research Programme beyond 2002 which is subject to 
evalution of FP5 
5  Figures applicable from 2000 are indicative and depend on the approval procedures of the respective 
instruments. The table considers only Community instruments (and not, for example, ESA funding). 
Annex 111: 5 infrastructure is demonstrated by the level of investment by the US and Russian 
governments in their systems..For example, US public investment in the current 
GPS is estimated to have amouni'ed to $ 10 billion already and the annual cost of 
sustaining the constellation is estimated at $420 million. 
Without Galileo, the EU would bc entirely dependent on an externally controlled 
and managed system for safety-critical applications (aviation, maritime) without- 
any guarantees on continuity and acceptable levels orscrvicc. 
Furthennore, the  investment  in  Galileo  makes  sense  in  cconomid  tcrms.  The 
GPS hardware market  i.n  Europc was cstimatcd  by  US researchcrs  in  1997 at 
$228.7 million and was anticipated to grow to $960 million in  2004. A study on 
behalf of the Commission estimated the cumulative GNSS goods and services 
market  in  Europe  (1998-2007)  to. bc  worth  €39  billion.  New  studies  have 
confirmed further important benefits which would depend on having Galileo in  .. 
addition to GPS, including an additional €40  billion  from' sales of.  equipment, 
and €40 billion from value added services over the period 2005-2023. Expected 
total benefits in the transport sector alone are in the region of €18 billion over  '. 
'  the first five years of operation. 
The Community strategy has the following objectives: 
-  improving the efficiency of the multi-modal transport system (increasing . 
-..  traffic  capacity,  reducing  environmental  damage  caused  by  transport, 
monitoring  consignments  of  dangerous  or  polluting .substances,  etc.) 
while increasing safety; 
-  providing added-value thr0ugh.a highly accurate service, with guaranteed 
service levels for users with safety-critical needs; 
-.  ensuring close co-operation  between  Member States and institutions in 
order to maximise benefits and minimise costs at the community level 
and to support the developm&t  of interoperability within a global system 
appropriate.to present day and future transport needs; 
-  promoting European economic growth by stimulating the development of 
harrnonised  standards and the global market for value-added goods and' 
services, with significant opportunities for European industry. 
-. 
9.2..  Grounds for the operation 
-  The  Community  contribution  should  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the 
measures to implement the guidelines for the development of the trans- 
European transport network, particularly thc navigation and  positioning 
netivork and the Common Transport Policy.  Organising co-operation on 
the basis of a clear strategy using the resources. available in  Europe is the 
only means of ensuring a role for Europe in the development of GNSS. 
.  ,  .  ~ 
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,  .  .  . -  In  its  Communication,  Towards  a  'Trans-Europcan  ,Posilioning  and 
Navigation  Network,  (COM  (98) 29 of 21  January  1098), whicli  was 
endorsed  by  the  Council  in  its  Conclusions  of  17  March  1998,  thc 
Commission set out the need for efficient and cost-effective navigation 
systems for civil use and compatible with military needs, high levels of 
safety with adequate European control for safety-dependent systems, and 
opportunities for European industry in the emerging satellite navigation 
markets. 
-  The Commission recommended  in its Communication on  Space (COM 
(96) 617 final of 4 December  1996) the preparation of a specific action 
plan to develop GNSS as a key spaceapplication for European industry.  .  . 
( 
9.3.  Monitoring and evaluation of the operation 
The operation  must be monitored  and evaluated on the basis of the following 
criteria: 
--  contribution  to  suslainablc  mobilily  through  incrcasc  in air  spacc  and 
other traffic capacity, 
-  reduction  of environmental damage caused by  transport ,and monitoring  . 
of consignments of dangerous or polluting substances; 
-  improved safety, leading to a reduction in the number of accidents caused 
by guidance system error or failure (landing1 docking, collisions between: 
vessels, etc.) 
-  .  .  rationalisation and optimisation of navigation systems, leading to a more 
coherent and interoperable global navigation aid structui6 iippropriate to  . 
' 
present day and future transport needs;  .  .  .  ...  .  .  .  .  .  . 
-  allowing European industry to compete fairly and freely in all segments. 
of  the  developing  satellite  navigation  market,  including  commercial 
transport  and  other ,applications,  development  and  maintcnancc  of 
satellite  equipment,  ground  stations  and  receivers.  This  will  have  a  '  .  ' 
.  .. 
-  significant  positive  effect  on  European  economic  growth  and  , .  .  .  . .  .  ,  '  r 
employment. 
The  organisational  structure  put  forward  is  designed  to  ensure  the  cost-effective 
. 
management of the project including'effective monitoring and evaluation. I 
! 
<. 
ADMINISTRATIVE  EXPENDITURE  (PART.  A  OF  SECTION  111  OF'THE  GENE~AL 
BUDGET)  .  . 
The allocation  of administrative resources  for this action  will  dcpcnd  on thc annual 
Commission  decision  on  allocation  of  resources,  -taking  parlicular  account  or 
additional staff and resources granted by  the budgetary  authority. The supplementary 
needs cannot, in  any  case, prejudge the decisions that  the Commission will  need  to 
iake concerning:  - 
-  .  the  .  request for new posts in the framework of the annual budget proposals, 
-  the resources allocation. 
10.1 Effect on the number of posts  . 




Other resources  . 
Total 
Staff to be assigned to  I Source  I  Duration  1 
posts  I 
posts  I 
resources in 
theDG or 
managing the operation 
Permanent  I Temporary 
I  (  department 
Existing 
I concerned 
4  12 













Other resources (indicate 
The amounts express the total cost of the additional posts over the total duration of the operation ($  ' 
fucetl)  or  for  12 months ($indefinite).  .  .. .  .  .- 
..  . 




2 520 O?O 
2.520000 
Method of calculation 
8x  3 years x  105 000 
.  . 
.- 
.  , 10.3. Increase in other operating expenditure as a result of ttie operation 
I TOTAL  105 000 
Budget heading 
(number and title) 
A-70 10 (Missions, travels ...) 
Method of calculation  Amount  (I  y 
105 000 
the Community 
25  annual  missions  outside 
the Community 
Estimated expenditure on missions, by redeployment of existing resources: Article A-130: 
Annex 111:  9 Annex 111 b).  Galileo -  detailed breakdown of costs 
(Implementation) 
Total  '  I  RECURRlNG  1  2 proto- 




Implementation  COSTS 
costs  per year 
reuse 
2000-2005  .  I; 200012008  Beyond 2008 
Totul System 
Payload  M 
I  platform 
Launches 
Platform 
1  Launches- 
Insurance 
Mission 
Sub-total  I 




running costs:  this will 
~nitially  rely on staff 
seconded from national 
administrations) 
I  TOTAL 
Figures above are based on submissions made by industry in the framework of ESA's GNSS- 
2  systems comparative study. These are  indicative  only and do not necessarily  reflect  the 
opinion of the Commission. 
Annex 111:  10 ANNEX BV: MARKET ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
Some of the main benefits of Galileo are political rather than economic, notably the advantage 
of retaining control  over safety critical  services. Other economic benefits, such as providing 
'insurance'  against future charging for GPS, are difficult to quantify. The analysis below  can 
therefore give only a partial view, concentrating on'  : 
.o  How Galileo will'enlarge the overall market for satellite navigation, primarily because GPS 
and Galileo together can provide a  more accurate andreliable service ; 
B  How  Galileo will  improve prospects  for European  firms, bccausc they will  havc a larger 
share of a larger market ;  ,  . 
o  The direct and indirect benefits to users from Galileo. 
No  reliable  figures  are  available  on  the  extent  to  which  Galileo  will  produce  savings  by 
replacing existing navigation aids, though this is also likely to be significant. Market forecasts 
over such a long period, in  an area where technological change is rapid, must be treated with 
considerable caution, though the broad orders of magnitude indicate that the overall economic 
benefits are very significant. (For example, the ncw generation of mobile phone technology - 
UTMS-  has the potential  to  combine with  Galileo  in  some  functions,  and  to  displace  it  in 
others). A priority for the project definition phase (June 1999 to December 2000) is to takethe 
market analysis to a stage where firm decisions can be taken on system performance, and where 
the private sector is willing to 'make,  financial commitments on  the  basis  of future expected. 
revenue. 
It  is important  to distinguish between the benefits  identified here,. which relate to the socio- 
economic desirability of Galileo,  and  the  issue  of financial  viability.  Many  of the  benefits 
identified  here will not  result  in project  revenue  without  regulatory  action. Nonetheless, the 
prospect of greater involvement of European industry in the applications market should,  increase 
its willingness to participate in a PPP to put Galileo in place. 
I 
The impact of GaPiPeo on the satellite navigation market 
A key measure of market growth is the penetration rate, which indicates what proportion of a 
category (e.g. new cars) is fitted with a navigation device. Forecasts suggest that penetration 
rates will rise much more rapidly, to a higher 'saturation'  rate in the GPS + Galileo scenario 
compared to.  the GPS only scenario. Among the segments where the difference isparticularly 
significant are: 
e,  automobile navigation (reaching a maximum of  93% in 201 3 compared to 90% in 2016) ; 
s  railways (reaching a maximum of 50% in 201  9 compared to 10% in 201 6); 
fleet management (reaching a maximum,of 95% 'in 201  3 compared to 90% in 20 16); and 
e  mobile telephony (reaching a maximum of 70% in 2014 compared to 55% in 2018). 
'  Most  of  these  figures  were  produced  by  industry  in  the  framework  of  an  ESA 
comparative study. This difference is explained by the fact that these segments are particularly sensitive to service  - 
maintenance and accuracy in built up areas and in terrain (e.g. forested areas and deep valleys) 
which "traditional"  GPS receivers find difficult, and where interoperable GalileoIGPS will offer 
an improved service. 
Economic benefits for Europe 
The  following  table  gives  an  estimate  of gross economic  bencfits  (turnover  for  Ei~ropean 
industry, and direct benefits for European uscrs) from equipment sales and value-addcd scrvices 
in the satellite navigation market, on a baseline GPS scenario, and on a GPS+Galileo scenario. 
It suggests that the benefits of Galileo could amount to around €80billion-over; the period  2005- 
23. These benefits arise from a combination of a larger market  (as indicated  above) and  a 
bigger share for European industry. On the latter, it is assumed that the market share for EU 
industry  under  the  Galileo+GPS  scenario  (rising  from  30%  in  20.05  to  60%  in  2023)  is 
substantially higher than for GPS alone, (15 and 30% respectively).  These figures result from 
research with industry, kt  are subject to a considerable margin of error. The figures,do not take 
account of displacement effects. 
These figures do not, however,  take account of indirect benefits of Galileo, which  arise for 
those not  using the service directly (e.g. rcduced  congestio'n, environmental benefits). These 
can however, be expected to be significant, given that, generally, about half of all congestion 
costs are 'indirect'. 
+
  Value Added Services  (  Equipment sales  1  Total  ,  . 
I  I 
I  I  I  .  . 
€ 154bn  GPS  € 74 bn  1.  €79 bn 
.  . 62235bn  GPS + Galileo 
. .  1  Benefits of Galileo 
I  I  I  1  42113bn  I  €122 bn 
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